Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe

From conversion to terrorism

An assessment of the factors influencing violent Islamist extremism and suggestions for counter radicalisation measures

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By Tomas Precht
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Foreword
This project is the result of a six-month research grant from the Danish Ministry of Justice, (Research and Documentation Unit). I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to those who conferred this grant. The views expressed in the paper are the author’s own and the Ministry of Justice has no responsibility for the content or any opinions expressed.

During the research process, I had the opportunity to have insightful meetings with both the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) including Centre for Terrorism Analysis (CTA) regarding specific elements of the report. These meetings served as background information and none of the information discussed is cited in the report. I am deeply grateful for the professionalism and openness I encountered. The Services do not have any responsibility for the views expressed or the content of the paper.

Finally, I would like to thank research fellows Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari and Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan from the Nanyang Technical University, Singapore (Rajaratnam School of International Studies) for taking time to discuss important aspects of the report.
Summary
The project intends to give an assessment of the factors influencing home grown terrorism and violent Islamist extremism in Europe. The purpose is to specify the specific phases, major characteristics and catalysts of the radicalisation process as well as suggesting relevant counter radicalisation measures.

The threat of Islamist radicalisation and home grown terrorism in Europe has been growing over the last 4-5 years. Terrorist targets have been trains, airplanes, buses and airports. Planned terrorist plots have also been directed at the nightlife scene, parliaments and national symbols. Those involved are born or bred in Europe and the majority of these individuals appeared to be integrated in their Western societies.

No single factor can be considered “causal” in the radicalisation process. A combination of factors is necessary to explain why there is an emergence of primarily young Muslim men, but also converts and women, willing to plan and carry out terrorist attacks killing others and even themselves.

Radicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or the foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people, and together they go through a series of events and phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a few end up becoming terrorists. The rest stop or drop out of the radicalisation process at different phases.

What is worrying, from a counter terrorism perspective, is that the process of radicalisation is occurring quickly, widely and more anonymously in the Internet age than only a few years ago. In particular, it raises the possibility of attacks from unknown self-starter groups. The major problem is that those involved appear to be normal and unremarkable.

The typical pattern of radicalisation consists of four overlapping phases:
1. Pre-radicalisation
2. Conversion and identification with radical Islam
3. Indoctrination and increased group bonding
4. Actual acts of terrorism or planned plots
The radicalisation process is unique for every person and there seems not to be a common profile of home grown terrorists. There is no determinism or logic of progression in the series of actions and events, although it is likely that increased group bonding and small group dynamics in phase 2 and 3 might serve as accelerators for advanced radicalisation. For many the process begins when they are teenagers. Individuals looking for a cause and a stronger Muslim identity have increasingly found the answer in the ideology of radical Islam. Often people are rather secular before they enter the radicalisation process. In general, radicalisation is taking place within loose social networks of friends and peers.

Home grown terrorist groups might form and grow autonomously up to a certain level. However, in the most recent terrorist cases in Europe, overseas travel and international contacts have been contributing factors in the more advanced phases of radicalisation (phases 3-4). In this regard, Al Qaida, as coordinator and source of inspiration, has a role to play for some networks.

Basically, three categories of motivational factors are seen to influence the radicalisation process:

1. Background factors such as:
   - Muslim identity crisis
   - Personal traumas
   - Experience of discrimination and relative deprivation factors
   - Living environment and peers (segregation and parallel society)
   - Alienation and perceived injustices
   - Relative absence of a critical Muslim debate on Islamist terrorism

2. Trigger factors such as:
   - Western foreign policy and single provocative incidents
   - The myth of Jihad and desire for activism
   - Presence of a charismatic person or spiritual advisor

3. Opportunity factors (places to meet likeminded people) such as:
   - The Mosque,
   - Internet and satellite channels
   - School, universities, youth clubs or work
   - Prison
   - Sporting activities
   - Cafes, bars or bookstores
Largely, home grown terrorism can be viewed as a sociological phenomenon where issues such as belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in the transformation process. Religion plays an important role, but for some it rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals. A common denominator seems to be that the involved persons are at a cross road in their life and wanting a cause.

Preventing Islamist extremism and radicalisation is a complex undertaking. There is no simple cause and effect, the perpetrators come from all areas of society and it is difficult identify those who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Therefore, the most optimal strategy to counter radicalisation is preventing young people from entering the radicalisation process in the first place. In this regard, several counter radicalisation measures seem relevant:

1. Societal measures like integration policies, the combat of Islamophobia and racism in society and promotion of ethnic role models are necessary. Society should accommodate pragmatically to different cultural needs but treating Muslims differently to everyone else risk to reinforce their feeling of being outsiders and not being part of society with shared values.

2. Counter ideology efforts to defy dissemination of highly polarising and radical views need to be developed. The schooling system has a vital role to play in confronting misperceptions and myths. The Muslim community should be particularly proactive in countering the radical Islamist narrative at places where young people meet. For instance by enforcing agreed upon minimum standards for Islamic institutions to include counter extremism programmes and inter-faith schemes.

3. Awareness training of street-level workers, police officers, social workers, teachers and Imams about the early warning signals of radicalisation are crucial.

4. Increased public diplomacy with focus on the domestic audience is important to challenge myths and misperceptions about Western foreign policy in for example the Middle East.
A common component in the suggested measures tackling radicalisation is the essential role of local communities and dialogue. The Muslim community needs to challenge the extremists directly at places of opportunity for radicalisation. However, government and local authorities should offer partnerships and support local actions of communities.
1. Introduction

The rising proliferation of home grown terrorism in the Western world during the previous 4-5 years signifies that the threat of terrorism no longer solely comes from foreign centrally organised groups like Al Qaida, Hezbollah or Jamaah Islamiyah. Today self-radicalized and self-organized domestic groups composed of persons who have had their upbringing and cultural influence in the Western world pose a growing threat to Western societies.¹

The assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam 2004, the London fertiliser plot in 2004, the London bombings 7 July 2005, the recent three terrorism plots in Denmark (2005-2007) and the two German terror plots (2006-2007) have made it apparent that a major proportion of terrorist activities in the West are carried out by apparently independent domestic networks.² These terrorist attacks and terror plots are all examples of how local radicalised networks passed the threshold of non violent sympathy/support for the Islamist cause. In a relatively short time span they moved on to actual operational capacity and willingness to carry out terror attacks in the countries they have been born or raised in.

Home grown terrorism has been described as decentralisation of Al Qaida and the rise of militant Islam. However, essentially it is due to a mixture of ideological influences, group dynamics and more structural problems in Western societies.

What these home grown terrorists seem to have in common is a deep-seated religious faith, often newly discovered, hatred of the West and a sense of alienation from their societies (Hoffman 2006; House of Commons report 2006). A common characteristic of these networks is that they are loosely knit and fluid, with varying, or no, international links.³ They

¹ However, despite this tendency major attacks are still being carried out by either Al Qaida or associated networks. The attacks in Bali 2002 and 2005, the Mariott Hotel bombing in Jakarta 2003 and the bombing of the Australian embassy in 2004 as well as events in Iraq suggest that regardless of the arrest or death of hundreds of Al Qaida and Jamaah Islamiyah members, including most of its known leadership these network remains capable of carrying out large-scale plots against Western targets. In other words, the picture has become more complicated – home grown terrorism is thriving alongside terrorism carried out by centrally directed international networks.

² Outside Europe the terrorist cells dismantled over the last 2-3 years in places like Toronto, Melbourne, Miami etc. serve to underpin this tendency. The attempted car bombing at Glasgow Airport in July 2007 is not considered as home grown terrorism in this context. Despite working as doctors or engineers in the UK the Glasgow bombers had only resided there a few years. They were not “born and bred” in Scotland (BBC 1 July 2007, comment by Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill).

³ Bruce Hoffman (2006) has identified 4 categories of the Al Qaida-movement: Al Qaida central (pre 9/11 organisation), Al Qaida affiliates and associates (e.g. LIFG/Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and GSPC/Salafist Group for call and Combat etc), Al Qaida locals (GIA in Algeria) and Al Qaida networks (ideological community). The home grown network/groups witnessed in Europe post
all comprise of a violent ideology and are influenced by radical propaganda shared though mediums such as the Internet.

To illustrate the scale of the problem the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) has assessed that the largest threat to countries like Denmark, as in most European countries, comes from small, unsophisticated groups of young men with Muslim or other affiliation that are "inspired by al-Qaida’s global Jihad ideology but who act autonomously and, apparently, without any control, support and planning from outside. These individuals are capable of selecting targets, planning, financing and carrying out terrorist acts by themselves." (PET 2006: 11). An increasing amount of militant Islamists are young men born and raised in the West - so called “home grown” extremists (PET 2007).

The British counterpart MI5 (the British Security Service) and MET (Metropolitan Police) have made similar assessments. In a speech in 2006 the former Director General of the British Security Service, stated that “more and more people are moving from passive sympathy towards active terrorism through being radicalised or indoctrinated by friends, families, in organised training events here and overseas, by images on television, through chat rooms and websites on the Internet” (Eliza Manningham-Buller 2006). According to the head of the London Metropolitan Police Anti-terrorist Squad, there has been an enormous rise in the number of people inside Britain who needed to be tracked and monitored since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. "What we've learned, and what we've seen, all too graphically and all too murderously, is that we have a threat which is being generated here within the United Kingdom" (Peter Clarke 2006).

The acting Director General of MI5 stated recently (November 2007) that MI5 had identified at least 2,000 individuals who are believed to pose “a direct threat to national security and public safety because of their support for terrorism...And we suspect that there are as many again that we don't yet know of” (Jonathan Evans 2007).

9/11 resemble the 4th category. However, most recent investigations into terrorist cases like London 7.7, the fertilizer plot in the UK 2004 and the plan to blow up 10 transatlantic planes in 2006 show a degree of international linkage is associated with these home grown terror groups. This may include overseas training or visits. The suspects who have allegedly been plotting attacks against American targets in Germany and perhaps Frankfurt’s international airport are alleged to have been training in Pakistani camps run by Islamic Jihad Union (The Economist 15 September 2007). According to PET, the Copenhagen 2007 terror plot (Glasvej case) has a direct link to Al Qaida (PET press statement 4 September 2007).
Home grown Islamist terrorist groups primarily consist of young Muslim men, most likely second or third generation immigrants but also converts and women who have come to know each other through school, sport, family relations, work or social-religious activities (PET 2006; AIVD 2005/06).

Radicalisation is a process that for many begins as teenagers. Individuals as young as 15-16 years have shown up in terrorist cases in countries like the UK and Denmark.

**Establishment of a typical home grown terrorist profile?**

The processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life causes them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are critical in order to understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support for their activities. There is no single cause or catalyst for radicalisation. Radicalisation is a multi-dimensional process influenced by a complex array of factors.

Persons who are radicalised are often well educated, have jobs and families and appear to be active in their local communities. Though, some might also come from socially or economically deprived sections of society.4 A majority of experts are stressing the “normality” of terrorists. They are emphasizing group, collective identity and organizational psychology as drivers, not individual psychopathology (Horgan 2005; Post 2005). Available research indicates that terrorists, in general, are not poor, badly educated persons from the third world, they are often stereotyped.5 The overall pattern is that there is no pattern.

However, recent developments have shown that recruitment for violent action among young people has proved to be a noticeable tendency, in particular among ethnic minorities most likely to be second or third generation immigrants or descendants in their coun-

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4 This picture is confirmed by a recent Clingendael study of 242 European Islamic extremists (Jihadist) from 2001-2006 (31 plots). According to the study: “They are mostly single males that are born and raised in Europe; they are not particularly young; they are often from the lower strata of society; and many of them have a criminal record. Given the fact that more than 40 percent of them were born in Europe and an additional 55 percent have been raised in European countries or are long-term residents, the label ‘home-grown’ is very appropriate to this group” (Bakker 2007).

5 Especially Marc Sageman (2004) and Robert Pape are proponents of this view. For example Pape’s comprehensive survey of 315 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980-2003 found that “suicide attackers are normally well educated workers from both religious and secular background. Especially given their education, they resemble the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement more than they do wayward adolescents or religious fanatics” (Pape 2005: 216). However, both studies are associated with methodological problems of lack of data (Sageman 2004: 64; Bloom 2005).
try of residence. A minor part of extremist activity is also initiated by converts from non-Muslim backgrounds.

It is probably impossible to profile a future terrorist, but there are several indicators to be aware of. The specific radicalisation process of individuals differs but it also shows similarities.
2. Research agenda and definitions

Research agenda
The focus of the project will be on Islamist radicalisation and counter radicalisation within Europe, especially the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark. A key to understanding and stopping the spread of radicalisation is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages.

The following two research questions will therefore be the main elements of the project:

1) What are the major mechanisms, catalysts and dynamics of the radicalisation process and home grown terrorism?
2) Which counter radicalisation strategies are likely to reduce the attractiveness of entering the radicalisation process and ultimately home grown terrorism?

Part 1 of the project intends to develop a model of the Islamist radicalisation process. The purpose is to specify the specific phases, major characteristics and catalysts. By developing a model of radicalisation it is hoped that authorities and local communities will be able to better identify the “unknown unknowns” (people who have the potential to turn to radicalism, but are currently leading normal lives) and individuals who are already being radicalised and intervene in this path. The analysis will focus on which sociological, personal and structural factors give credence to the attraction to radical Islam and are making some people capable of carrying out terrorist attacks.

The radicalisation path is assumed to be composed of four phases as illustrated in the timeline below. The critical phase is judged to be the shift from the second to the third phase:


Part 2 of the project intends to identify (based on the radicalisation process) the most likely prevention measures to be applied in reducing radicalisation. The purpose is to give an overview of potential measures and establish where there may be a need to complement our current counter terrorism approach with valuable lessons learned. The existing
counter radicalisation strategies of three countries the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark will be singled out in appendix 2 and will serve as an inspiration for the suggested actions.

**Data**

The data of the project consists of:

- Review of public accessible intelligence information about the radicalisation process and counter measures from national intelligence services, multilateral organisations, ministries etc.
- Review of public investigations, such as the British “Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005” and testimonies before public committees.
- Review of existing academic literature on radicalisation.
- Study of legal documents from selected court cases.
- Meetings with researchers from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang University, Singapore.

The project is based on unclassified information in order for it to be made publicly available.

Case studies from the UK and the Netherlands are selected because like Denmark they have been involved in the post 9/11 fight against terrorism, have a large ethnic minority and have had terrorism arrests made. Finally, these countries have developed explicit counter radicalisation strategies.

A general methodological concern is the lack of primary data on terrorist profiles and individual motivations. The analysis is largely based on empirical data collected by others. Relevant players are difficult to access since they often are in prison or dead. Those who have served sentences are seldom willing to participate in interviews or to contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon. The very nature of terrorism is simply hampering insight into the specific motivations and backgrounds of terrorists. However, Jessica Stern (2003) is one of the few examples of a researcher who has been successful in actually interviewing terrorist/extremists of three religions (Muslims, Jews and Christians). Marc Sageman (2004) is another example.
Since the use of interviews is an expensive method in terms of time and cost and the likelihood of getting access to relevant persons is limited, or impossible, the use of secondary data analysis especially from intelligence and security services is necessary in establishing a better understanding of the complexity of different factors involved in the radicalisation process.

A further concern regarding the use of case studies, is that they tend to be eclectic and often do not give the full picture of events. The use of media accounts (e.g. from court hearings) can be especially problematic since they are not necessarily accurate, neutral and unbiased. These problems are sought to be alleviated by cross checking references, using court records and assessments and publications from intelligence agencies.

Finally, interviews in terrorism research tend to be carried out by opportunity sampling (e.g. interviews are carried out with the groups/persons who are easily available, accessible and willing to talk) which is likely to distort the picture and make it difficult to generalise findings and patterns to the wider population.6

**Definitions**

*Home grown terrorism* is defined as acts of violence against targets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in which the terrorists themselves have been born or raised. The purpose of such terrorism is to advance political, ideological or religious objectives.

A distinctive factor of home grown terrorism is that it is carried out by persons who have had their formative phase, upbringing and cultural influence take place in the Western world.7 However, evidence from many home grown terrorist case has shown that some level of international contact or visit to foreign countries for ideological inspiration or training camp attendance has taken place.

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6 Silke (2001: 8) has highlighted that 97% of interviews in terrorism research are carried out by opportunity sampling and only 20% of articles provide substantially new knowledge which was not available before.

7 In contrast, Sageman (2004) has shown that Al-Qaida activity is generally carried out by people outside their home country – relatively few carry out attacks at home, no matter where in the world they take place. E.g. 9/11 was carried out by people from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.
Terrorism - No generally accepted definition of terrorism exists. However, a core element in most definitions of terrorism is the use of violence or force for the advancement of one's objectives and deliberately targeting innocent civilians or other targets in order to affect society, the social order or the political decision making process (PET 2006: 28; AIVD 2006: 10). The deliberate exploitation of fear through violence is a major element of terrorism. Terrorism differs from other forms of violent activism/extremism with respect to the extent of violence that is used.

Radicalisation is defined as a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear, as a method of effecting changes in society. Radicalisation can take place within any extremist group (from left/right wing groups to environmentalist, separatist and terrorist groups). It is important to note that radicalisation, as such, does not necessarily have to result in terrorism and the use of violence.

Islamism refers to a political ideology that strives to create a state and society in conformity with religious doctrine and Sharia law. Islamism, as such, does not have to include a violent aspect. An Islamist is a person who uses religious arguments to further political goals. In contrast, a militant Islamist is willing to use violence to advance his/her goals.

Islamism is not a uniform and monolithic entity. On the contrary, it consists of many movements who have different goals and means. Only a small minority of Islamists justifies violent confrontation. While the militant (Jihadi) movements attempt to impose tradition by the use of force and instalment of Sharia law, others focus on missionary activism (al-Dawa) which strives to preserve the Muslim identity and faith against forces on unbelief. Missionary Islam is essentially apolitical and does not use violence. A third category

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8 The UN has no agreed-upon definition of terrorism yet. However, the UN's "academic consensus definition," written by A.P. Schmid (1988) says: "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought".

9 However, the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service assesses that radical Dawa is under transformation in the Netherlands. This movement might eventually heighten ethnic and religious tensions in the Netherlands, with increasing polarisation as a result of its intolerant message concerning those who do not share its views (AIVD 2007: 13).
of Islamic activism involves political movements who work within the established political system to attain political power on a national level (ICG 2005).

**Militant Islamist (or violent Islamism)** is used as a term for Muslim individuals who use violent means to achieve political ends which are inspired by the ideology of radical Islam. For example, it is seen as a religious duty to defend Islam against Western values and free the occupation of Muslim heartland. For some militant Islamists, the goal of re-establishing a Caliphate is used as a justification for the use of violence.

**Muslim extremist** describes persons who support the ideology behind militant Islam but who do not actually carry out terrorist actions.

**Extremism** is defined as immoderate uncompromising views and measures beyond the norm. For the most part, extremist groups pose a threat to public order, but not to national security.

**Jihad** (“to strive”) has a dual meaning. One meaning is the inner struggle to become a good and devout Muslim – the greater Jihad. The other usage of Jihad is the (defensive) armed struggle in defence of Islam – the lesser Jihad. Violent Jihadism is referring to the latter concept.

For militant Islamists Jihad is an individual duty, which justifies the usage of violence against oppression and the enemies of Islam including the West. The term Jihad is used in the names of many international terror organisations. Examples include: The International Islamic Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (established by Osama Bin Laden in 1998), Laskar Jihad, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Since the terms Jihad and Jihadism are highly controversial concepts of which there is no theological consensus among clerics and Imams, the use of the terms in this project will be limited. The usage of Jihad might give terrorists the perception that there are religious justifications for terrorism. Instead, the term militant Islamist is preferred in order to signal that they carry out purely criminal actions.
3. The threat from home grown terrorism

Although it is difficult to precisely measure the extent of the spread of home grown terrorism, intelligence information indicates that the problem is increasing.

According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) home grown terrorism and the so-called Jihadist threat were beginning to form as early as 2002. The Service found that there “were indications that radical Muslims brought up in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for Jihad and that they might proceed to perpetrating localised terrorist attacks” (AIVD 2002). Since 2003 the AIVD has observed that “Grass root radicalisation, eventually leading to home grown terrorism, was gaining ground” (AIVD 2006: 17).

In 2004 (before the London 7/7 attacks), the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) stated that the UK would face a continuous threat from home grown terrorism over the next five years. However, it is particularly interesting to note that the judgements of the British Joint Intelligence Committee two years earlier in 2002 did not consider home grown terrorism to be likely compared to terrorist attacks carried out by foreigners: “attacks against UK were felt more likely...to be conducted by terrorists entering from abroad than by British nationals resident in the UK” (ISC 2006: 26). This assessment had clearly changed in early 2004. In November 2006, both the head of MI5 and the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly stated that the struggle against (home grown) terrorism probably will last a generation (International Herald Tribune 10 November 2006; Manningham-Buller 2006).

The declassified excerpts from the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 2006 also highlight the threat (especially in Europe) from self-generating cells without any direct links to Al Qaida: “We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance..... The Jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings” (NIE 2006).

\[10\] Specifically the JIC noted that: “***% of current Security Service targets for investigation were British and judged that over the next five years the UK would continue to face a threat from “home grown” as well as foreign terrorists” (ISC 2006: 25).
Intelligence services in other European countries such as Denmark and Sweden share similar views, namely the possibility of nationals, mostly young men with Muslim background or converts, becoming involved in terrorist activity (PET 2006: 11; SÄPO 2006: 22).

The threat of home grown terrorism and radicalisation appears to have developed over the period 2001-2005. The exact timing of when this new phenomenon of home grown Islamist terrorism became a real problem varies from country to country. In general, it probably began to take off around 2002/2003, although many of the seeds for radicalisation were planted in the 1990s by especially radical preachers – the preaching, which took place at the Finsbury Mosque in London is an example of this.

During this period most other European countries also realised the phenomenon of radicalisation among its citizens but the idea of people who were born and brought up in Europe being willing to carry out attacks in their home country first really became apparent in 2004/2005 with the murder of Theo Van Gogh and the London bombings. Before that the threat was, to a large extent, perceived to stem from Jihadists coming from abroad and Europe was seen as “a place for recruitment, logistics and finance – not a place for Jihad” (PET 2006: 14; AIVD 2005: 17).

Figure 1 below serves to illustrate this change of focus and the complexity of the Islamist terrorist threat that has evolved over the last decade – from a largely external threat by international terrorist organisations/returning Jihadist and Al Qaida to also including a rising element of home grown terrorism and blow back from the conflicts in especially Iraq and Afghanistan.
Figure 1: Threat picture – from external threat to home grown terrorism

Where the focus in the mid 1990s was on transnational networks of extremist terror organisation from North Africa and the Middle East (e.g. the Algerian GSPC and Libyan LIFG) and so-called Jihadist migrating to Europe from the conflicts in Afghanistan (1979-1988) and Bosnia (1992-1995), the focus shifted in the late 1990s to Al Qaida.

After 9/11 and particularly since 2002/2003 the threat picture shifted towards more autonomous Western based groups who did not have any direct links to other international terrorist organisations, but were inspired by the ideology of militant Islamism. The Madrid and London bombings, together with other recent plots, have been assessed as falling into this category. Although investigation has shown that the groups involved all had some level connection with Al Qaida and other international elements (see for instance ISC 2006).

In addition, the return of Jihadists from conflict zones around the world (e.g. people who have fought in Iraq, Chechnya or Afghanistan recently) are becoming a growing threat. This phenomenon, termed “blow back”, entails that foreign volunteers fighting in the aforementioned conflicts find new targets after they return home to their country of residence or origin. They bring back with them combat experience, weapons knowledge, ideology and connections to transnational terror groups. If these veterans get in contact with

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11 For an historical account of the different phases and types of terrorist networks see for instance AIVD 2006; Hoffman 2006. Each type of organisation differs in strategy, capacity, modus operandi and membership profile.

12 The war in Iraq is assessed by the CIA as being able to generate a drastic blowback of its own: “The blowback could be longer and more powerful” than that from the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s (Bergen & Reynolds 2005: 2). The Mujahideen from the Afghan-Soviet war in the 1980s returned home to lead terror campaigns in countries like Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s. Many of the returning Jihadists also began to approach members of local Muslim communities in Europe for recruitment for violent Jihad (see AIVD 2006: 16).
radicalised circles in their home country they can serve as ideological or operational inspiration. They might supply local group’s with expertise that otherwise would not have been available without links to transnational terror organisations. According to Robert Richer, who was associate director of operations in 2004 and 2005 for the CIA: “The Jihadis returning from Iraq are far more capable than the Mujahideen who fought the Soviets ever were,” and “They have been fighting the best military in the world, with the best technology and tactics” (Mazzetti 2007; NIE 2006).

This assessment is shared by AIVD, which sees indications that local networks are linking up with international Jihadist elements/veterans returning from Iraq. This may add to the Islamist threat in Europe (AIVD 2006: 57). 13

Most recently, the acting Director General of the MI5 has stated that Al Qaida is conducting a deliberate campaign against the UK. “It is the expression of a hostility towards the UK which existed long before September 11, 2001. It is evident in the wills and letters left behind by actual and would-be bombers. And it regularly forms part of Al Qaida’s broadcast messages. ...Over the last five years much of the command, control and inspiration for attack planning in the UK has derived from Al Qaida’s remaining core leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan - often using young British citizens to mount the actual attack” (Evans 2007).

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): “There is increasing evidence that “core” al-Qaeda is proving adaptable and resilient, and has retained an ability to plan and co-ordinate large-scale attacks in the Western world” (IISS strategic survey 2007).

**In summary**
- Western intelligence services assess that the threat of home grown terrorism is growing and probably will last for up to a generation.

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13 The Iraqi war is displaying a new phenomenon, the involvement of extremely young European Muslims. “Investigators throughout Europe have noticed that many of the volunteers who leave for Iraq are groups of teenagers, high-school students and petty criminals from the continent’s poor immigrant neighbourhoods with no connections to a terrorist group, who seemingly decide to act on their own” (Vidino 2005: 30).
• The terrorist threat in Europe is multilevel and has, since the 1990s evolved from primarily being external to also including a rising element of internal threat from local residents (specifically developing around 2003).

• Direct links to other international terrorist organisations does not seem to be particularly prevalent. However, individual members of home grown terrorist groups have shown a tendency to travel overseas for training or possibly religious fortification.

• Al Qaida, as a coordinator and source of inspiration, still has a role to play.

• Young Muslim men or converts seem to constitute a major recruiting pool.

• Blow back from especially Iraq, has the potential to serve as a catalyst for home grown terrorism.
4. Home grown terrorism as a historical phenomenon

The present rise of home grown Islamist terrorism is not the first time home grown terrorism has surfaced in Europe. During the 1970-1980s in particular, small groups of left-wing, nationalist or separatist groups were responsible for several terrorist attacks in Europe. To some extent, these attacks had the same hallmarks as today’s home grown terrorism.

Radical left wing organisations like Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany (RAF), Action Directe in France, Belgium’s Cellules Communistes Combattants (CCC), Greece’s Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (17N) and the Red Brigades in Italy as well as separatist movements like Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Separatist Group (ETA) in Spain, were the main proponents of this wave of terrorism. The Danish gang “Blekingegade-banden” who killed a police officer during a robbery in 1988 and who supported the PFLP financially is another example of a local terrorist group from the 1980s. All these groups and organisations were made up of nationals who were born and raised in the European countries in which they carried out attacks.

Many of the left wing terrorists were motivated by revolutionary political ideology such as Communism, Marxism, Maoism or Stalinism and had a disapproval of democracy, the market economy and the US, they also displayed solidarity with the third world. Their general aim was to destabilise society in order to bring it towards revolution, by using bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. Like terrorist organisations from other eras and today, the European terrorist organisations used the argument “if violence constitutes the most efficient and essential instrument without which the revolution cannot succeed, then it is desired, rational and justified” (Kassimeris 2005: 69).

While left-wing terrorism in the 1970/1980s was ideologically motivated, home grown terrorism of today is often carried out by individuals who, to a large extent, are religiously motivated. However, both strands of terrorism share the same belief in creating a better world by revolution and by use of force.

In contrast to the home grown terrorism of the 21st century - which appears to be loosely organised and fragmented - the individuals of these earlier groups belonged to a clearly defined organisation that had a clear command and control apparatus (Hoffman 1999: 8).
Although the terrorist groups of the 1970-1980s were extremely violent, it was generally not the intention of these terrorist movements to kill indiscriminately and in large numbers, as we have witnessed with home grown Islamist terrorists.

In comparison with terrorist groups of the past, today’s home grown terrorism cells are generally smaller. They may consist of only a few members or sometimes up to 10-20 people. In comparison the RAF consisted of perhaps some 20-30 individuals, 17N of 15 members and the Red Brigades consisted of more than 300 active members at their peak (as of the early 1990s active strength of the Red Brigades was probably fewer than 50). IRA and ETA had probably some 200-400 activists (Drake 2005: 51; Hoffman 1999:10).

However, like present day home grown terrorism, the terrorist groups in the 1970s-1980s grew slowly as loose networks of minor groupings and had, in the beginning, only a few members. 17N is the exception from this rule since from the beginning it had a clear goal and consisted mainly of persons who had blood bonds which is a major explanation why it could remain active for 27 years without any arrests (Kassimeris 2005: 69, 73).

The typical European left-wing terrorists in the 1970-1980s were males between 20-25 years who had a higher education or were dropouts from university and who came from a middle class upbringing. Leaders were normally older ranging from 30-40 years old. Female terrorists, with the exception of RAF where up to 60% of the members were women, had supporting rather than operational roles (Hudson 1999: 48, 53 and Russell and Miller 1978). Home grown terrorists today are often second or third generation immigrants, primarily men. Women remain in supporting roles. The ages of the perpetrators range from teenager to mid-twenties (some are in their thirties) but there is no significant trend in age profile of leaders. General studies from the 1970-1980s concluded that terrorists were not psychopaths or otherwise mentally disturbed but more or less normal people with no specific terrorist “mindset” or personality who were driven by an ideological way of viewing the world (Hudson 1999: 43-44; Hofmann 1998). The recruitment processes of

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14 Members of right wing groups (e.g. Nazi groups) however, tended to be young, relatively uneducated members of the lower socio-economic classes (Hudson 1999: 51-52).

15 On exception to the “rule” of terrorists as non-psychopaths is probably the Baader-Meinhof Gang/RAF and their affiliated groups. According to Hudson “The German terrorists seem to be a special case, because of their inability to come to terms psychologically and emotionally with the shame of having parents who were either passive or active supporters of Hitler” (Hudson 1999: 60).
former terrorist groups were highly selective in order to avoid members who could arouse suspicion and ultimately threaten the survival of the group.

While the recruiting ground in the 1970-1980s was largely student movements and universities, the home grown terrorism cells we witness today are more diverse without any clear profile or recruitment base. They seem largely to be people who happen to know each other.

Many of the terrorist groups in the 1970’s-1980s used countries like Libya and East Germany as refuge and as a logistical and practical training ground. Nowadays the same practice is carried out by some potential home grown terrorist groups, but in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Members of the 7/7 bombers and the UK fertiliser plot seem to have received training or to have become radicalised through overseas visits to Pakistan. Likewise, a member (Ahmad Khaldahi) of the group arrested in Odense 2006 for plotting a terrorist attack travelled for a short while to Iraq in 2005. Although he claimed this was only in order to visit a refugee camp and make a documentary (Politiken: 1 October 2007).

In summary

- European terrorists in the 1970-1980s were mainly born and raised in the countries they attacked.
- Group members were motivated by revolutionary political ideology such as Communism or anarchism (not religion) and perceived the state as repressive.
- Members belonged to an identifiable organisation that had a clear command and control structure and a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives. Home grown terrorists of the 21st century appears to be more loosely organised and fragmented.
- Both men and women were involved in a variety of roles, but men predominated in leadership and operational roles (age approximately 20-25 years old). Home grown terrorist today are often second or third generation immigrants, primarily men, with women in supporting roles (age from teenager to mid/end twenties).
- No specific terrorist personality profile can be established of the terrorist in the 1970s-80s. Like today, they appeared normal and sane.
• Generally, the terrorists were well educated and came from good socioeconomic backgrounds. At present, the recruitment base of home grown terrorism is more diverse.
• Foreign countries were used as place for training and refuge (as also witnessed with home grown terrorism today to some extent).
The ideological foundation of the present wave of home grown terrorism and militant Islamism is primarily inspired by the philosophy of four charismatic figures: Hassan Al Banna in Egypt, Sayyid Mawdudi in Pakistan, Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran (Kepel 2002: 5). Other persons are also important for the Islamist movement especially Ibn Taymiyya from the 14th century and Abdallah Azzam who popularised the concept of armed Jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Today Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri have a huge impact on the wider Islamist movement. However, it is interesting to note the Osama Bin Laden is not among the most cited intellectuals among present day Jihadi scholars. It is actually the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who is the most cited (refer to ideological influence map, appendix 1).

All of the first mentioned four figures argue for an anti-Western philosophy, rule by Sharia, defence of Muslim heartland and reestablishment of the Caliphate (Sunni Islam) or an Islamic state (Shia Islam).  

*Maududi* who created the Jama’et-e-Islami party in Pakistan in 1941 was the first Muslim thinker to turn the Islamic religion into an ideology for political struggle. He was a proponent for the independence of Pakistan from the UK and the creation of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. Maududi asserted that Western democracy and sovereignty of the people was incompatible with Islam. It was his view that Islamic government must accept the supremacy of Islamic law over all aspects of political and religious life.

Like Maududi, *Hassan al Banna*, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 1928, opposed secular and Western ideas which were seen as the root cause of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world. The fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey 1924, the rise of secularism and the growth of nationalism in Egypt motivated al Banna to reclaim the political dimension of Islam. He advocated a return to Islam as a solution to the problems in Muslim societies. The slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood was “The Quran
is our constitution” and an Islamic state was seen as the solution to the political problems facing Muslims (Kepel 2003: ch.1, 28). The Muslim Brotherhood has, ever since, been a major inspirational factor for other thinkers and radical movements. However, it should be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt “renounced violence in the 1970s and has since demonstrated its pragmatism by participating in electoral politics and other formal institutional bodies, essentially abiding by the established rules of the game despite being banned by the authorities” (Zambelis 2007).

The thinking of Sayyid Qutb has probably had most influence on the radical Islam movement of the four figures. He was hanged by the Egyptian government in 1966 making him one of the greatest martyrs in Islam and a substantial source of influence and inspiration today. In his book, Milestones, he condemns Western modernity. Particularly the secular nationalistic and socialist movements in the 1960s. These were seen as showing disregard for Islamic law, the Islamic state and the Islamic community. Qutb thought that Muslim communities lived in a state of Godless ignorance (Jahiliyya¹⁷) which needed to be reverted or re-conquered for Islam. He argued of the importance of offensive Jihad to eliminate Jahiliyya, not only from the Islamic homeland,¹⁸ but also throughout the entire world. Qutb hereby served as an important inspiration of radical Islam from the 1970s until today. He serves as an inspiration for Osama Bin laden and other radicals who propose holy struggle to establish a global Islamic state based on strict interpretation of the Koran.¹⁹

Like Maududi and Qutb Ayatollah Khomeini perceived that Islam was under threat from Western influence, secular rule and modernisation. However, unlike Sunni Islam Khomeini did not talk about restoring the Caliphate – instead he wanted to create an Islamic state were the supreme religious cleric should assume the leading role.²⁰ Khomeini led the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 until his death in 1989.

¹⁷Jahiliyya describes the state of ignorance in which the Arabs lived before the revelation of Islam by the Prophet Mohammed in the 6th century AD. The consequence of Jahiliyya is Takfir (which means that an individual or a group who previously were considered Muslims are in fact kafirs, non-believers in God).

¹⁸In this regard, Qutb argued of the necessity of killing corrupt and lawless rulers. The Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was seen as such a person and he was killed in 1981.

¹⁹The quick defeat of the Arab troops during the Six Day War by Israeli troops in 1967 was also a trigger of radical Islam.

²⁰The leading role in an Islamic state was to be taken by the religious cleric, the faqih, until the missing twelfth Imam (al-Mahdi) would return. His concept of velayat-e-faqih (Islamic government) stated that the faqih should guard Islam and Sharia against anti-Islamic forces.
Of specific relevance to today’s terrorism was Khomeini’s issue of the death sentence (fatwa) in 1989 of Salman Rushdie, author of “The Satanic Verses”. It symbolised the export of Islamic values and Islamic law into the Western world. Issuing of the fatwa expanded the Muslim Umma’s authority (community) to cover the world - making it a place for Jihad.

Finally, the writings of Abdallah Azzam and Ibn Taymiyya have inspired the tradition of Jihad. In the 1980s, Azzam called for the liberation of the land of Islam from foreign occupation. He demonstrated that Jihad in Afghanistan was an obligation for all good Muslims. Likewise, Taymiyya’s writings about invading Mongols (14th century) are extremely popular among Jihadists and have since been used as a basis for justifying fighting a Jihad against the foreign invaders.

**Implications for home grown terrorism**

Al Qaida and movements like Takfir Wal-Hijra (who excommunicates other Muslims) and Al Muhajiroun, which today are inspiring networks in Europe draws parts of their inspiration and ideological elements from the above mentioned historical figures.

According to the Takfiri ideology, the whole of society (world) is designated as a legitimate target until the Muslim Umma is restored under the leadership of the Caliph and Sharia law.\(^{21}\) Those who adhere to another faith (both non-Muslims and Muslims who do not practice the proper form of Islam) are to be fought and put to death. It is seen as acceptable to kill Muslims who are not “pure” enough.

Of particular interest, for present day counterterrorism efforts, is the fact that the Takfiri ideology allows believers to disobey rules and practices of Islam in order to blend in and avoid detection while plotting attacks. Followers are allowed to shave their beards, drink alcohol and live according to Western values in order to blend in with Western society. According to the Takfiri-ideology, the fighters will be martyrs in Paradise after death.

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\(^{21}\) Takfîr Wal-Hijra was founded in Egypt in 1971 by Shukri Mustafa, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been in prison with Sayyid Qutb. It was a radical movement which pronounced Takfîr on the whole Muslim world for being Kafir (impious, non-Muslim), except for its own disciples (Kepel 2002: 83-85). True Islamists are to leave their countries - go on Hijra – to gain their strength. Many Egyptian followers of Shukri dropped out of society and lived in caves.
Like Takfir-Wal Hijra, Al Qaida also argues for the wage of war and armed Jihad against non-believers. Al Qaida's objectives include the elimination of foreign influence in the Muslim world, elimination of Israel, and the creation of a new Islamic Caliphate. Since Islam is under threat, every Muslim is justified to engage in armed Jihad in the view of Osama Bin Laden.\textsuperscript{22} Al Qaida is often said to be associated with so called Salafism - an ideology that claims that Islam has strayed from its origins and which advocates a return to the traditions of the first three generations of devout ancestors (Salaf in Arabic).\textsuperscript{23} Salafism emerged in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century as a reaction to innovation and the spread of European ideas. For Salafists their most notable exponent was the 14\textsuperscript{th} century Ibn Taymiyya (Kepel 2002: 220).

For many militant Islamists the religious justification for violent action supplied by Al Qaida and movements like Takfir is the foundation for their willingness to engage in terrorism. As an example, the video of the 7/7 bomber Khan that was aired on Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005 illustrates the religious commitment for violent Jihad which motivated Khan: “Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... This is how our ethical stances are dictated.... I ask you to make dua to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into gardens of paradise” (BBC News 1 September 2005).

According to the official account of the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 the focus of Khan’s will is actually even more on the importance on martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment. It also contains anti-Semitic comments (House of Commons 2006: 19).

Similar martyr statements can be found among other terrorists. Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, stated in the court hearings after the murder: “I acted purely in the name of my religion,” (BBC News 12 July 2005).

In general, potential militant Islamists perceive the West as degenerated and representing “evil”. According to the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service many of the radicalised

\textsuperscript{22} For references on Al Qaida, see Esposito (2002); Bergen (2002); Kepel (2002) and Gunaratna (2003).

\textsuperscript{23} For a review on Salafism see, Stemmann (2006); Kepel (2002): 219-221 and Livesay (2005).
potential terrorists see themselves as participants “in a mythical, apocalyptic final battle with evil (the Western world) in the context of which, in principle, all exponents of evil (in fact any Western citizen) should be destroyed” (AIVD 2005: 33). This element of myth or misperception is very important in understanding militant Islamism especially in order to counter the radicalisation process.

In summary

- The growth of secular nationalism in the Arabic world in the 1950-1970’s, the rise of modernity, Western influence, secular rule, (and the quick defeat of the Arab troops during the Six Day War by Israeli troops in 1967) have been the historical triggers of radical Islam.
- Figures like al-Banna, Maududi, Qutb and Khomeini have provided major ideological motivation for the Islamist movement in the 20th century. Other figures are also important especially Ibn Taymiyya and Abdallah Azzam.
- In general, Islamism entails an anti-Western philosophy, rule by Sharia law, defence of Muslim heartland and reestablishment of the Caliphate or an Islamic state.
- Khomeini’s death sentence of Salman Rushdie in 1989 symbolised the export of Islamic values and Islamic law to make the whole world a place for Jihad.
- Today Al Qaida and movements such as Takfir Wal-Hijra – inspired by the above mentioned figures – often serve as an ideological inspiration for local radicalised terror networks in Europe.
- Martyrdom and religious commitment are some of motivators for home grown terrorists.
6. The radicalisation process – dynamics and catalysts

No single factor can be considered “causal” in the radicalisation process. There are many pathways to terrorism. A combination of factors is necessary to explain why there is an emergence of young Muslim individuals (men and women) willing to carry out terrorist attacks killing others and even themselves.

Radicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or the domestic and foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people. Together they go through a series of events and phases that ultimately can lead to terrorism. However, only a few persons end up being terrorists. The rest stop or drop out of the radicalisation process at different phases.

What is particularly worrying, from a counter terrorism perspective, is that the process of radicalisation is occurring quickly, widely and more anonymously in the Internet age than only a few years ago. In particular, it raises the possibility of attacks from unknown self-starter groups (NIE 2006).

It is generally assumed that major factors in the radicalisation process are the influence of a spiritual leader, a sense of alienation, perception of marginalisation, political oppression, discrimination, poverty, overseas training experience, the Internet and perceived wrong doings of Western foreign policy and an aspiration of “wanting to do something”. However, none of these factors seem to be sufficient, or necessary, in the path towards terrorism (for an overview of the empirical literature see Kruglanski and Fishman 2006; Sageman 2004 and Pape 2005). A major problem with this root cause approach is the fact that many people may share similar backgrounds and experiences but only few of them become radicalised.

Similarly, systemic research for a particular terrorist personality among terrorists in the 1970-1980s as well as terrorism in the 21st century has shown no significant sign of a special psychological make up among terrorists (Hudson 1999; Horgan 2003; Kruglanski and Fishman 2006). Actually according to a report by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) the majority of the individuals who have carried out or planned attacks in Europe
or North America over the last three years led “unremarkable” lives, had “unremarkable” jobs and had little, if any criminal history (NYPD 2007: 2).

However, it appears that group bonding, grooming and solidarity within a group of fellow extremists are critical to our understanding of home grown terrorism and the dynamics of the radicalisation process (House of Commons report 2006).

Based on existing research and publicly accessible information from security services, it is assumed that four distinct phases (refer to table 1) apply in the typical radicalisation process (Pressman 2006; Ranstorp 2006; House of Common report 2006; Mueller 2006, 2007; AIVD 2006; NYPD 2007).

The four phases are separate although they have overlaps. There is no logic of progression or timetable associated with this process. The radicalisation process can happen over a few month as well as over several years and individuals might enter or re-enter some of the phases and then stop while others go all the way to the critical 4th phase of acts of committing terrorism. The important point is that there is no determinism in the series of actions and events, although there is a likelihood of increased group bonding and small group dynamics in phase 2 and 3 serving as an accelerator.
### Table 1: A model of the process of radicalisation – from conversion to terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Conversion and identification</td>
<td>Conviction and indoctrination</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conversion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conviction</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reinforcement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Muslim identity crisis</td>
<td>1) From no faith to religious identity</td>
<td>1) Isolation from former life</td>
<td>1) Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Experience of discrimination, alienation and perceived injustices</td>
<td>2) More radical interpretation of Islam</td>
<td>2) Increased training</td>
<td>2) Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Living environment, neighbourhood and family</td>
<td>3) Shift from one faith to another (e.g. Christianity to Islam)</td>
<td>3) Assignment of roles</td>
<td>3) Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Personal traumas</td>
<td><strong>Identification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Catalyst</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key components</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Relative lack of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in the West</td>
<td>1) Increased identification with and acceptance of the cause of extremism</td>
<td>1) Overseas travel (religious or camp training)</td>
<td>1) Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meeting places (opportunity)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Triggers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Meeting places</strong></td>
<td>2) Target selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque</td>
<td>1) Glorification of Jihad, activism, “wanting a cause”</td>
<td>Private homes</td>
<td>3) Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>2) Foreign policy towards the Muslim world</td>
<td>Countryside/cars</td>
<td>4) Fabrication of bomb or other means of terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School, youth clubs or work</td>
<td><strong>Meeting places</strong></td>
<td><strong>Meeting places</strong></td>
<td>5) Test run</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>Same as phase 1</td>
<td>Same as phase 3</td>
<td><strong>Meeting places</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same as phase 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family and friends</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase 1: Pre-radicalisation

Pre-radicalisation describes the many general background factors that make individuals receptive to extremism just before the actual radicalisation process begins. A variety of factors apply such as: Muslim identity crisis, experience of discrimination, alienation and perceived injustices, personal traumas, neighbourhood, living conditions, family and relative absence of Muslim public debate on Islamic terrorism in the community.

For example, a neighbourhood or an enclave dominated by a diaspora community might create an increased feeling of isolation and may serve as an “ideological sanctuary” for
radical thought (NYPD 2007: 22). Other places such as the Mosque and Muslim bookshops also serve as fertile ground or provide opportunity for introduction to the radicalisation process. The relative absence of a critical Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism also contributes to a feeling of acceptance of radicalism.

The above background factors might make individuals receptive and vulnerable for radicalisation. However, all background factors are common to many people (e.g. most Muslims have experienced discrimination and many are housed in the same areas), but only a very small fraction actually go down the radicalisation path. For some it might have the opposite effect and result in isolation and non-action. Background factors do not explain why some people become radicalised and the majority not, but they do serve as the general setting for many of those who have been associated with recent terrorist cases (for example see: NYPD 2007 or House of Commons report 2006).

What is important to note at this stage, is that home grown terrorists do not necessarily begin as radicals. They might not even be practicing Islam or be devout before entering the radicalisation process.

**Phase 2: Conversion and identification**

The most significant pattern to observe in phase 2 is that individuals change their religious identity or behaviour. It is a transformation that can take three forms:

1. from no specific faith or religious observance to a religious identity
2. from a normal religious observance to a more radical interpretation of religion
3. a shift from one faith to another (e.g. from Christianity to Islam)

This transformation process is largely influenced by factors which are unique to every individual but often starts by persons being frustrated with their lives, events internationally or politics. They are searching for an identity and a cause and often extremist Islam offers the solution to their quest. Some individuals may be slowly moving away from their former identity and beginning to build a new personality based on religion. This is often not their parents’ form of Islam, but a more action oriented Islam, which is associated with the ideology of radical Islam. They are likely to display increased attendance at the Mosques or places where radical Islam is discussed. Some people also begin to change their
appearance, such as by wearing Islamic clothes and growing a beard. They may also show social commitment (NYPD 2007: 31).

Radicalisation often begins in prisons, the Mosque, via the Internet, at school or within other social settings or through family and friends.

At the personal level a crisis situation such as divorce, loss of job, death in family, lack of social mobility or racism can trigger this change. Wiktorowicz (2005: 19-20) describes these as “cognitive openings”. Other major triggers are:

- Glorification of Jihad (urge for activism)
- Western foreign policy towards the Muslim world (outrage)
- Presence of charismatic person/leader in the community (a spiritual guide)
- Feeling of community by belonging to a group (identity seeking)
- Relative absence of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in the West (a single narrative)

The prospect of being part of a group and to feel important is a major contributing factor towards the gradual progression towards radicalisation.

**Phase 3: Conviction and indoctrination**

In the ensuing phase 3 of the radicalisation process, potential extremists usually begin to isolate themselves from their former life (although not everyone) and identify even further with the cause of radical Islam. Catalysts like group bonding, overseas travel and training camps (foreign and local) facilitate this process. In almost every one of the recent terrorist cases or plots at least one person has travelled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq or another European country.

Individuals accept fully the worldview of militant Islam – e.g. the West is seen as degenerated, Islam is perceived to be under attack and society needs to be shaped according to Sharia law and religion. Gradually the belief is rooted that violent action is necessary to advance the ideology of radical Islam and violence against non-believers is justified by the higher cause.
Meeting places seem to change from the open to more private settings and the countryside and a higher degree of security awareness is displayed. Public places, like the Mosques, are abandoned, especially if the preaching is not conceived as radical enough.

Association with a group of likeminded individuals plays a significant role in the intensification of radicalisation in this phase. The presence of a spiritual leader can also have an important influence on the radicalisation process, although grass root radicalisation seems to be gaining ground on top down radicalisation. For example, in addition to top down recruitment the AIVD has seen “a growing tendency among young Muslims to go through a radicalisation process on their own initiative” (AIVD 2006: 9, 29).

**Phase 4 - Action**

Phase 4 is the critical action phase where focus is on implementation, planning, target selection, surveillance, fabrication of explosives or other means of terrorism and possibly carrying out a test run.

This phase is characterised by each member accepting the obligation of carrying out a terrorist attack. In comparison with the other phases, this stage can progress relatively quickly taking only few weeks or months.

The training that began in stage 3 is reinforced. Overseas travel also often takes place, particularly amongst leaders.

Group bonding and loyalty are intensified and individuals become even more alienated from their former life. The personal goal or identify shifts towards the group goal. This group loyalty is reinforced by further training activities like those which began in phase 3 (paint ball, camping etc).

By watching videos, the internet or other extremist media individuals try to get the final moral support for carrying out terror actions or even suicide attacks. Individuals tend to become very security oriented and meeting places are cars, private homes and places difficult to detect for the authorities.
7. Motivational factors

Three categories of factors appear to influence an individual’s motivation to begin the radicalisation process: Background factors, trigger factors and opportunity factors (see figure 2). Often radicalisation is not an explicit choice but a development that is happening gradually (Stares and Yacobian 2007).

Figure 2: Motivational factors for entering the radicalisation process

- **Background factors**
  (Identity crisis, trauma, neighborhood, racism)

- **Trigger factors**
  (Militant ideology, foreign policy, group, spiritual leader)

- **Opportunity factors**
  (Meeting places such as mosque, school, sporting activities)

As discussed earlier no typical receptive person or terrorist profile exists (Sageman 2004; Pape 2005; Bakker 2007). There is no common social background, educational or neighbourhood profile that pre-determines who might be susceptible to radicalisation. Only religion, group dynamics and an exposure to Western cultural and social forces seem to be the common denominator in the home grown terrorist cases in the past 3-4 years.

By looking at the recent terrorist cases in the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark it can be seen that young second and third generation Muslim immigrants/descendants comprise a large proportion of home grown Islamist terrorists (see table 2).

Most are born and raised in Western societies, often in or close to, major cities and have attended regular schools and universities. In general, they have been radicalised in their
Western home countries. Although some have also travelled overseas or visited radicals in other European countries.

A Muslim upbringing is a common factor in almost all cases, however, a few individuals are converts who converted to Islam as teenagers. Converts are often immigrant/descendants (e.g. from the Caribbean or Asia) but may as well have a native Western background.

**Table 2: Examples of personal background of home grown terrorists in the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The London 7/7 Bombers 2005 (UK) | Three of the four London bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, and Hasib Hussain were all British-born Muslims (Jermaine Lindsay was a convert, see below). The three were between 18-30 years old and all grew up in the same neighbourhood in Leeds.  
Khan (1974), who was married, studied business at Leeds University and employed as a learning mentor at a local school.  
Tanweer (1982) studied sport science at university (he left before completing his BSc). He came from a wealthy family.  
Hussain (1986) was not a high achiever academically, but attended college to study business. |
| Fertiliser plot 2004 (UK)        | The leader of the group Omar Khyam (1982) grew up in a largely secular Muslim household in the UK. He was a student at the University of North London.  
Salahuddin Amin was born in London (1975). Moved to Pakistan aged four. Returned to UK with family in 1991. He has a degree in product design engineering  
Jawad Akbar was born in Pakistan (1983), moved to Crawley, at age eight, and was student at Brunel University.  
Waheed Mahmood (1972) lived in Crawley. Trained as an apprentice in the gas industry but later worked in a tile shop, where he gave a job to Omar Khyam.  
Anthony Garcia (1982) was born in Algeria. His family moved to UK in 1987 and settled in East London. He left school at 16. He worked as a security guard. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic aircraft plot 2006 (UK)</td>
<td>Several British Muslims have been arrested in the alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on board several airliners traveling from the United Kingdom to the United States. According to CNN 13 August 2006 (based on a US security memo) all were born in the UK (most were of Pakistani descent). They had good reputations in their neighbourhood and did not express radical sentiments. Among those arrested were a biochemistry student, an employee at Heathrow Airport and a 17-year-old who recently converted to Islam. Trials have not started yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK Israel suicide bombers 2003 (UK)</td>
<td>Omar Khan Sharif and Asif Mohammed Hanif, who carried out a suicide bombing in Israel, killing people at a Tel Aviv pizza parlour (Mike’s Place) in April 2003, were from Derby. Sharif went to King’s College, London. Both were UK citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Pearl murder in Pakistan 2002 (UK)</td>
<td>Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, born in the UK, was arrested in 2002 in connection with the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. Saeed, originally from Wanstead, East London, attended a British public school. Later he dropped out of the London School of Economics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second shoe-Bomber 2001 (UK)</td>
<td>Saajid Badat, the would-be second ‘shoe-bomber’, who changed his mind, attended a Church of England school in Gloucester. He was UK born. He planned to blow up a transatlantic flight on its way to the US in 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstad group 2004 (NL)</td>
<td>Mohammed Bouyeri was born in Amsterdam in 1978 to parents who had immigrated from Morocco. He attended a local polytechnic but did not obtain a degree. He started to radicalize shortly after his mother died and his father re-married in 2003. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering Dutch film director Theo van Gogh. Nine members of the group were sentenced in 2006 as being members a criminal terrorist organisation. Members of the group were suspected of (but not convicted) of planning terrorist attacks at the Dutch parliament, national airport and a nuclear reactor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glostrup case 2005 (DK)</td>
<td>In 2005 Danish police arrested four people on charges of terrorism, in connection to the arrests in Bosnia of Abdulkadir Cesur and Mirsad Bektasevic (aka Maximus). Only Abdul Basit Abu-Lifa aged 17 was found guilty. He was 16 when he was arrested. Abu-Lifa was born and raised in Denmark, although his parents are from Jordan. He often went to the Mosque and participated in Koran classes. Abu-Lifa was convicted in 2007 for compliancy to a terror plot in Bosnia or an unspecified location in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vollsmose case 2006 (DK)</td>
<td>A group of primarily Danish citizens (second generation immigrants) who were planning one or more terrorist attacks against targets in Denmark or Europe were arrested in 2006. Metal splinters and a bottle containing TATP explosives as well as other chemicals were found. In 2007 the court handed down an 11-year sentence to Mohammad Zaher, a 34-year-old Palestinian. He is married and the father to one child. Ahmad Khaldahi, a 22-year old Iraqi citizen, received an 11-year prison sen-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third man sentenced, Abdallah Andersen, is a Danish convert (see below under converts).

Bomb plot in Copenhagen/Glasvej case 2007 (DK)

In 2007 eight persons of foreign origin were arrested at locations around Copenhagen. It is the assessment of PET, that the main persons of this case are to be considered militant Islamists with international connections involving direct relations with Al Qaida. The suspects were arrested on charges of planning a terrorist attack and accused of storing unstable explosives, possibly TATP. The persons arrested were all men of foreign origin aged from 19 to 29 years. Six of the suspects were Danish nationals and two were foreign nationals holding residence permits in Denmark.

Two 21 years old were imprisoned. Both have roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Berlingske 5 September 2007). The trial has not begun yet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Converts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The transatlantic aircraft plot 2006/ Don Stewart-Whyte (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Stewart-Whyte who was charged, together with co-conspirators, with plotting to blow up airplanes on transatlantic routes in 2006, is the son of a UK Conservative Party agent, and converted to Islam after being a drug and alcohol abuser. The art student went to the prestigious Dr Challoner’s Grammar School in Chesham, UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The London 2005 bombers/Jermaine Lindsay (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jermaine Lindsay was born in Jamaica (1985) but he was raised in the UK and converted to Islam at age 15. He was successful at school and interested in sports, although unemployed at the time of the bombings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dhiren Barot 2004 (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhiren Barot, who was born in India but grew up in the UK, was convicted in 2006 of planning a variety of attacks using chemicals and explosives. He was born a Hindu and converted to Islam at the age of 20. He had travelled to Pakistan to attend training at a terrorist camp in 1995. He planned to use a radioactive dirty bomb and attack places like the World Bank and the IMF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Andrew Rowe 2003 (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Rowe was convicted in London after being caught with dangerous materials to be used for terrorist attacks and was also suspected of trafficking arms to Chechen militants. He was born to Jamaican parents and had dabbled in petty crime before converting to Islam in the 1990s at age 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The first shoe-bomber/ Richard Reid 2001 (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Reid, the so-called ‘shoe-bomber’, who tried to blow up a plane in 2001, had a Jamaican father and English mother and grew up in a middle class suburb, later joining the Brixton Mosque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hofstad 2004/Jason Walters (NL)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Walters from the Hofstad group was born in the Netherlands (1985) to a US father and Dutch mother. He converted to Islam as a teenager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vollsmose case 2006/ Abdallah Andersen (DK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Andersen, received a sentence of four years in connection with the Vollsmose case. He is a 32 year old Dane who is a convert to Islam. He is married and was unemployed at time of the arrest. He was an active debater in Danish newspapers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Background factors

Before beginning the first steps of the radicalisation process several background factors appear to make people more vulnerable to radicalisation. The most common background factors are:

- Muslim identity crisis
- Experience of discrimination, alienation and perceived injustices
- Living environment (neighbourhood, peers and family)
- Relative lack of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in the West

The characteristics of these background factors are described below.

**Muslim identity crisis and personal traumas**

Many young Muslims living in the West are split between the traditional Islamic culture of their parents and the secular multi-cultural society in their country of residence. “They find they are not understood at school, by their parents or by local Imams and can only discuss issues amongst themselves. Second and third generations in particular find that they do not know how to belong or to be British with few to guide them. For Muslim boys this seems to demonstrate itself into anger, petty crime and becoming easily susceptible to extremist ideology” (Wilton Park 2006: 6).

It is noteworthy that the identity crisis entails a crucial element of wanting to distinguish oneself by an assertive identity rather than a passive position like that of their parents’ generation (AIVD 2006: 36). Likewise, it is interesting to note that many of those entering the radicalisation process appear to be rather secular. For instance, Wiktorowicz (2005: 102) has found that many members of Al-Muhajiroun in the UK were not particularly religious and did not have any real religious education before entering the organisation.

In their search for identity, some individuals are turning to religion. Under certain circumstances, this can lead to an Islamic counter culture among young Muslims who embrace radical interpretations of Islam. According to researcher Oliver Roy, Western based terror-

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24 Many arrived in the 1960/1970s as guest workers, lived in separate communities and were expected to return home eventually. However, as pointed out by Niblett, supported by family reunification policies and lack of economic opportunities in their homelands most immigrants stayed. The European policy of multiculturalism permitted, and even facilitated, the emergence of parallel societies, which were reinforced by a tendency to concentrate immigrants in housing complexes (Niblett 2006).
ists are “a lost generation frustrated by a Western society that does not merit their expectation and their vision of a global Umma is both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalization that has made them what they are” (Roy 2005). Other analysts find that the concept of Umma now plays a similar role, as did the proletariat for leftist groups in the 1960s. It is “an imaginary” and therefore silent community that gives legitimacy to the small group pretending to speak in its name (Mamdani 2005). Instead of identifying themselves with society and its values, some begin to identify themselves with the “global Umma” and the cause of radical Islam.

The general problem of “belonging” is illustrated by surveys of Muslim opinions in the UK where up to 1/3 of respondents would argue that they have more in common with Muslims in other countries than with non-Muslims in Britain” (Mirza et al 2007: fig. 3; 38). Other indicators of this tendency are increased wearing of headscarf, calls for Muslim to obey Islamic practices, special food in schools etc. However, this is probably a natural reaction for Muslims living in a different culture. A similar pattern of increased focus on cultural symbols and identification with the homeland and traditions is also likely to be seen when secular Westerners live in a foreign culture.

While identity crisis and individual frustration might be able to explain some individual’s attraction to radical Islam other factors like personality or personal traumas (e.g. childhood or war experiences) could also be a contributing background factor. Some researchers have found that personal grievances and revenge have been seen to motivate some terrorist (Stern 2003a). However, research within this area has not yet found any general psychological profile of terrorists (Sageman 2004) and lessons from European terrorism in the 1970s-1980s do not suggest a connection in the majority of cases.

**Experience of discrimination and relative deprivation factors**

The turn towards a religious identity may be reinforced by several relative deprivation factors such as alienation, social dissatisfaction, poverty, experiences of discrimination and

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25 For instance Mir Aimal Kansi who shoot several CIA officials in 1993 partly as revenge against the CIA: “which he apparently felt had mistreated his father during Afghanistan’s war against the Soviets” and John Allen Muhammad (the Washington sniper) who “appears to have been principally motivated by anger at his ex-wife for keeping him from seeing their children, and some of his victims seem to have been personal enemies” (Stern 2003a).
social exclusion. In this view embracement of radical Islam can be seen a possibility to gain dignity, a feeling of belonging, respect and having a “call”.

Statistics show that a relatively large proportion of European Muslims are having difficulty finding a job in countries like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands. A recent report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) showed that European Muslims’ educational achievement falls below average and their unemployment rates are higher than average in Europe. As a group, they are over-represented in low-paying sectors of the economy and in the most precarious and least desirable jobs (EUMC 2006).

The perception of “being a victim” can create a tendency to turn one’s back on society. A reaction that is reinforced by the increased Islamophobia (especially after 9/11) seen in many European countries and in the media. In addition, the police are often seen as being biased by stopping, arresting and/or interviewing Muslims only because of their appearance and their religion. Many young Muslims feel discriminated against in ordinary life, for example being denied access to discothèques etc. The result is increased polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims, which further makes individuals receptive to the process of radicalisation (AIVD 2006: 62).

However, all these factors do not necessarily lead to radicalisation or terrorism. Although relative deprivation is likely to cause frustration and despair, it does not necessarily imply that anger is turned into violence as expected by a simple frustration-aggression hypothesis. It might also lead to withdrawal, depression or escape (Kruglanski and Fishman 2006: 196). Most Muslims who live in deprived areas, who are unemployed or not economically well-off, do not turn into terrorists. Deprivation is also not a prerequisite for becoming a terrorist. Actually, many of the terrorists associated with for instance the 2005 bombings in London and other European plots had good jobs and education. The 2007 Glasgow airport attack which was carried out by a doctor and an engineer with a PhD demon-

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26 Levels of unemployment actually relate more closely to ethnicity than religious grouping, and even more importantly, to socio-economic class (Mirza et al. 2007: 68).

27 For instance in Germany only 3.3 percent of immigrants who go through the German school system makes it to universities (Bennhold 2005).

28 Likewise, the leftist terrorist groups in the 1970-1980s who were educated, integrated and not poor were not driven by a relative deprivation (Kruglanski and Fishman 2006). They were rather driven by an ideological goal.
strates that persons with a successful professional life also can carry out terrorist acts. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances relative deprivation may be considered a contributing factor for individuals entering the path of radicalisation (Sageman 2004: 93).

**Living environment and peers (Segregation and parallel society)**

Individual radicalisation generally takes place in an atmosphere where others are being radicalized as well. The place of residence might offer the location where people first encounter extremist thoughts, either from within their own family or peers or from others within the community.

According to the NYPD, isolated ethnic communities often serve as “ideological sanctuaries” for radical thought and also display a certain tolerance for extremist subculture which enables radicalisation (NYPD 2007: 22).

Caution has to be displayed when using such arguments but the tendency of an increasing degree of radicalisation within parallel societies has also been echoed at a PET hosted conference on “The Roots of Terrorism in Europe” (PET 2006: 81). AIVD as well finds that so-called anti-integration radicalism can be seen as a security risk (AIVD 2004: 17). The sociological argument is that ethnic concentration in certain areas is enhancing social exclusion and crating parallel societies where minorities are not part of the major values in the society.

Statistical surveys suggest that there has been a rising level of urban segregation in several European countries including Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands over recent years (FRA 2007: 30). To illustrate this development the official UK report into the three-day battle between Asian Muslims and whites in 2001 in Oldham, UK, blamed it on a segregation so complete that the lives of the two communities “did not seem to touch at any point” (The Economist: 1 February 2007: A house with many mansions). The integration of Muslims has not been helped by the growth of Islamophobia in the West, which has led many Muslims to reorient themselves towards their own communities and cultural and religious backgrounds.

However, this tendency of "self-segregation" where people prefer, or are forced by socio-economic factors to live in an area dominated by their own ethnic or faith group, does not
have to lead to radicalisation. Most people living in mono-ethnic areas are peaceful law
abiding citizens. They are not potential terrorists. This seems to be confirmed by prelimi-
nary research by the Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research, The University
of Manchester. A study of 75 cases of Muslims charged with terrorism offences between
2004 and October 2006 has shown that Muslims charged with terrorism are no more
likely to come from areas perceived as segregated than other parts of Britain. Nor do they
seem especially poor (Finney and Simpson 2006). However, it should be noted that the UK
research is tentative and preliminary and does not include all the accurate data available
on terrorism suspects and convicts.

The Dutch Intelligence and Security Service has recently begun to talk about Islamic Neo-
radicalism (a non violent version of radical Islam) which is arguing for the establishment
of ‘Islamised’ enclaves within society; physical areas in which Sharia law prevails over
Dutch and European legislation (AIVD 2007: 83). It is a trend that is disrupting the rela-
tionships within and between ethnic groups in society.

No firm conclusion is possible at this stage, but the existence of parallel societies may be a
contributing factor in the early phases of the radicalisation process, especially by serving as
sanctuaries for extremist ideology. However, what stands out is that social bonds and
personal relations appear to have an influence on radicalisation. In his study of Al-
Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz found that a common route to radicalisation were via personal
relations and to a lesser extent through outreach by radical groups and meetings. Faced
with social pressures not to participate from parents or siblings involvement often is hid-

den (Wiktorowicz 2005: 56).

Relative lack of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in Europe
Although mainstream Muslim organisations and Imams in Europe have condemned terror
attacks in Madrid, London and recent terrorist incidents or plots,29 Muslim engagement in
public affairs is still relatively underdeveloped. There are few moderate Muslims who

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29 In connection with the two failed bombings in London and the Glasgow airport attack in June 2007 Britain's most influential Mus-
lim umbrella organisation, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) signalled a major shift in policy. It urged its communities to play a
key and potentially decisive role in the fight against terrorism by working hand in hand with police, declaring that condemnation is
not enough. At the same time British Muslim initiated an anti terrorism campaign titled "Not in Our Name" with adverts in newspa-
ners (The Guardian 3 July 2007). Muslim organisations and Imams have also condemned the recent foiled terror plots in Denmark
and Germany in 2007.
speak out openly against Islamism, challenge radical interpretations of Islam and the positions of defensive/ambiguous Muslim leaders and extremists.

Often moderate voices are not heard above the din of the fanatics (Peterson 2002). This assessment was also voiced by the then British PM Blair who in June 2007, called on moderate Muslims to reclaim the public debate over Islam declaring “that the religion’s “authentic voices” should be given a stage over the voices of extremism” (Perlez 2007). In addition, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) finds that it is essential that Al Qaida’s extremist ideology, and its "single narrative" that sees Muslims as victims of non-Muslim aggression, is addressed, both in the Islamic world and elsewhere (IISS 2007).

The need for a Muslim debate on Islamism is illustrated by recent opinion polls among Muslims in several European countries. These show that tacit support of terrorism, support for organisations like Al Qaida and the implementation of Sharia law appears to be relatively high especially among young Muslims:

- In 2006 approximately 15 percent of Muslims surveyed in Britain, France, and Spain believed suicide bombings and other forms of violence were at least sometimes justified in the defence of Islam (PEW Research centre, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, released 22 June 2006).

- An ICM opinion poll conducted in the UK in 2006 indicated that a fifth have sympathy with the "feelings and motives" of the suicide bombers who attacked London on 7 July 2005, although 99 per cent thought the bombers were wrong to carry out the atrocity (ICM opinion poll, Sunday Telegraph 19 February 2006).

- In another survey of British Muslims, approval for groups like Al Qaeda was voiced by 13% of young Muslims (16-24 year olds) and 3% of older Muslims (55+ olds). Some 37% of Muslims between 16-24 year would prefer to live under Sharia law against 17% of those over 55 (Mirza et al. 2007: 5, 46).

As an illustration of the tacit support of terrorist activities or the so-called “soft tail of radicalisation” one of those involved in the 21 July 2005 attempted bombings in London was
given three safe houses and helped to escape the UK before he was arrested in Italy (Wilton Park 2006).

Marginalisation of Muslims or the perception of being outsiders, high unemployment rates and low socio-economic standing, a feeling of not being part of society, the existence of parallel societies and youthful rebellion against the community can explain a lot of this support for radical Islam and the lack of a more visible Muslim front against terrorism.

Nevertheless, positive developments are under way and Muslim preachers/Imams and ordinary people are beginning to realise that they have to seize back their religion from the small minority of Islamists who seem to have highjacked it (Amanpour 2007). In a recent terrorist case from Denmark, the Glostrup case, the family of the 17-year-old Basit Abu Lifa, discovered his plans to travel to Bosnia and took away his passport, probably preventing him from committing a more serious crime. Another example of families intervening in terrorist plots is that of Omar Khyam (the ring leader of the fertilizer plot in the UK 2004). In 2000, after discovering that he attended a Mujahideen training camp in Pakistan, his family tracked him down and sent him home. He later continued his activities and was eventually sentenced to life in prison in 2007 for a plot to bomb the UK. Although not successful in preventing terrorist planning these two examples show how ordinary Muslims are trying to counter radicalisation and terrorism.

Furthermore, as seen in countries like the UK, radical Imams and preachers have begun to be excluded from the Mosque environment.

To turn the process around is difficult, but it is vital to reinforce the voices of moderate Islam to win the battle of ideas within the Muslim community. Helping moderates come forward and oppose the threat within their communities might help prevent early radicalisation pathways.

**In summary**

- An absence of a powerful counter narrative to radical Islam can facilitate the radicalisation process by giving comfort to potential extremists presented with a selective and distorted interpretation of Islam.
• Existence of parallel societies might be a contributing factor in the early phases of the radicalisation process, particularly by serving as sanctuaries for extremist ideology.

• Factors such as alienation, social dissatisfaction, poverty, experiences of discrimination and social exclusion may reinforce radicalisation.

• Individuals may turn to religion as part of a search for meaning, identity or community feeling or as a means of rebellion against the community.

• It is important to note that background factors only are indicative. Most Muslims who live in deprived areas, who have an identity crisis, who are unemployed etc. do not turn into terrorists. In general, Muslims and converts are law abiding, peaceful citizen, who support the values of society and only a small minority have the potential to become radicalised.
9. Trigger factors

The transition from pre-radicalisation to actual radicalisation (phase 2-4) seems to be influenced by several trigger factors. The most common are:

- Western foreign policy and isolated provocative events
- Presence of a charismatic person, leader, incubator or spiritual advisor
- Glorification of Jihad, activism and “wanting a cause”

Foreign policy and single provocative incidents

Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are seen by many Muslims as occupiers of Muslim land and it is a source of anger. Pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison, Guantanamo Bay and TV broadcasts from battle zones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Chechnya, Kashmir, Gaza, Somalia, Sudan and other areas contribute to an image of violence, maltreatment and injustices towards Muslims. The West is perceived to be pro-Israel and as having double standards with regard to the Muslim world. For example, Western governments are seen as supporting non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa including those in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, while at the same time not recognising the results of free elections other places (e.g. Palestine 2006). Furthermore, Western “non action” in Kashmir and Chechnya only reinforces an image of neglect and powerlessness of the Muslim Umma.

This view of Western foreign policy seems to play a crucial role in creating anger, especially among younger generations of Muslims (Neumann 2006: 76). For instance, the official motivation for the London suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan was the perceived injustices carried out by the West against Muslims around the world (House of Commons report 2006: 19). Shahzad Tanweer, Khan’s fellow bomber, has also revealed in a videotape published a year after 7/7 that the UK’s foreign policy was to blame for the terror actions. The following quote from Shahzad Tanweer speaks for itself: "For the non-Muslims in Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this...You are those who have voted in your government who in turn have and still continue to this day continue to oppress our mothers and children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya....Your government has openly supported the genocide of more than 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah...What you have witnessed now is only
the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become stronger...We are 100% committed to the cause of Islam. We love death the way you love life”. Tanweer added the attacks will continue "until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq" (BBC news 8 July 2006).

According to a British Foreign Ministry memo from 2004 the UK's involvement in the war in Iraq “seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organisations” (Neumann 2006: 76).

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) also assesses that the Danish military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq “affects the risk of terrorist acts being committed against both Danish and foreign targets in Denmark and Danish targets abroad” (PET 2006: 16). The focus of PET regarding persons and circles in Denmark who are suspected of supporting forces in Iraq that fight the coalition forces has also been increased: “in the years to come this field of effort is expected to constitute one of the core tasks of PET” (op.cit: 29/30).

The willingness of Muslims born and raised in Western countries to join the Jihad in Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan is an indication of the power of foreign policy issues to mobilise support for terrorist groups and radicalisation. Public information on this issue is rather limited, but the numbers are probably relative low due to the difficulty of arriving in a conflict zone and the low demand for foreigners who do not have experience or are not battle hardened.

However, both 9/11 and the Madrid bombings were prepared well before the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Belgium and France did not support the war in Iraq, but both countries have been targeted in subsequent terror planning (Moniquet 2005; Mirza et al 2007: 15). This indicates that radicalisation and willingness to commit terrorism is a complex phenomenon, which is not just something connected to the presence of Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Wars in Muslim heartland and foreign policy issues are not the only suggested triggers for radicalisation. The publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten in 2005 showed how a seemingly local event had the capability
of changing the national and international threat picture. The cartoons were considered
blasphemous by many Muslims worldwide and resulted in widespread violence and de-
struction. Incidents such as this and the provocative speech by the Pope in September
2006, on Islam and violence, are a sign of division between the Muslim world and the
West. It is a perceived division that might be fuelling the ideas of radical Islam and serve as
trigger for some individuals to enter the radicalisation process. For instance, in a Danish
terrorist case (Vollsmose) it emerged that the defendants’ motivation was apparently out-
rage at the publication of the Danish cartoons.

The myth of Jihad and a desire for activism
It is a central position of the ideology of militant Islamism or violent Jihad that Islam is
under constant threat and every good Muslim must fight these hostile forces. It is a fight
between good and evil. This myth is being reproduced by propaganda, preachers and
among groups of young people. It is myth that is appealing to some young Muslims who
have a desire to “do something” and who want to have a simple “solution” to perceived in-
justices and threats against Islam and react against the society in which they live.

Organisation like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun and a community of like-minded in-
dividuals seem to be a strong attraction for individuals who are at a crossroad in their life,
who are frustrated, who are bored, lonely or who are searching for a personal Muslim iden-
tity. Trill seekers may even find these groups appealing. External shocks like loss of job,
death in family, TV pictures of atrocities against Muslims, Internet propaganda etc. can
also make people wanting to seek a new direction in life.

Particularly in the final phases of the radicalisation process (phase 3-4), the myth of being
awarded the “garden of paradise” and become a martyr (shahid) are highly motivating fac-
tors. For instance, the leader of the UK fertiliser plot, Omar Khyam, was referred to as a
"72-er" because he was prepared to die for the cause and receive 72 virgins in paradise
(Telegraph 2 May 2007). Sageman has described these persons as “enthusiastic volunteers,
trying to impress their friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers, or sha-
hids as they call themselves, have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants”
(Sageman 2007: 2). To an extent radical Islam is part of an Islamist counter-culture among
some Muslim youngsters.
**Presence of a charismatic person or a spiritual leader**

The presence of a charismatic person or a radical preacher seems to have been a common factor in many of the most recent European terrorist cases.

For example, Mohammed Bouyeri and the Hofstad network were inspired by a Syrian preacher\(^{30}\) although members inside the group also contributed ideologically by translating religious texts (AIVD 2006: 37). Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, was influenced by Abu Qatada and Abu Hamsa of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London (BBC News 28 December 2001). Another person who spent time at the Mosque was Kamel Bourgass, an Algerian jailed for the murder of a policeman and an alleged ricin poison plot in the UK (BBC 7 February 2006). The 7/7 London bomber, Jermaine Lindsay, met the other members of the group through Abdullah al-Faisal, a well-known radical preacher (Malik 2007; House of Commons report 2006). Another radical preacher, Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, who founded Al-Muhajiroun in the UK, appears to have been the mentor of the two middle class UK citizens of Pakistani origin who carried out a suicide attack in Israel in 2003 (Bergen 2005: 9). Finally, in the Danish Glostrup terror case, and possibly also the Vollsmose case, an Imam named Abu Ahmed allegedly have been giving lectures to some or all of the involved persons (Berlingske 6 September 2007).

Radical preachers or Imams are especially likely to influence young person’s belief systems by speaking from a position of authority on religious issues. These preachers are often associated with the Mosque, but are also active in spreading their messages through the Internet, in prisons, via video, DVD, in written material or in private homes.

However, there seems to be a tendency that people who have become radicalised now are moving away from the hierarchical Mosque system. According to the 7/7 report “evidence suggests that radicalisers will increasingly keep potential recruits away from too strong an association with a public figure and extremists are more and more making extensive use of the Internet” (House of Commons report 2006: 31). The focus of intelligence and security services on public places of worship have resulted in extremists moving away from Mosques to private homes or other places in order to avoid detection (op.cit). So-called garage Mosques have become a result.

\(^{30}\) The Syrian is believed to be Redouan al Issar, a self-proclaimed mujahid with knowledge of Islam that although limited surpassed that of most youngsters in the Hofstad group. They were fascinated by his charisma and apparent learning (Vidino 2007).
A significant problem for security authorities today is that the seeds of radicalism might have been sown 10-15 years ago. In the UK, for instance, self-appointed preachers such as Abu Hamza and Abdullah al-Faisal, now respectively jailed and deported, may already have done their work. Abu Hamza gave more than 100 talks across the UK in 1999 which were regarded by many as highly inflammatory (BBC 10 November 2006, Wilton Park 2006: 3). The UK has since begun to expel foreign born clerics who incite hatred.

Although the presence of charismatic preachers seems to be able to influence young Muslims and converts, it is not necessarily a precondition for radicalisation. For example, the 7/7 London bombers, other than Jermaine Lindsay, did not seem to be particularly influenced by a radical preacher.

Besides spiritual leaders, another important factor is the role of a personal mentor or ringleader. In almost every terrorist group, there is a ringleader such as Khan (7/7 London bombers), Bouyeri (Hofstad group), Atta (9/11) or Khyam (the UK fertiliser plot) who has the capability to inspire and influence the thinking of other members. For instance, Khan was older than the others in his group and had cultivated a reputation as a mentor in the community (Kirby 2007: 418). From the left-wing terrorism in the 1970-1980s, this phenomenon of a influential leading figure is also well known.

An early AIVD study from 2002, where the focus was on former Mujahedins as recruiters, found the role of a recruiter to be fundamental in the radicalisation process. A recruiter is often seen to have wisdom, respect, “be able to arrange matters for other brothers” and to exercise leadership (AIVD 2002: 11-13). “The aura of wisdom is obtained by a recruiter among other things by the expertise in the field of radical-Islamic religious doctrine. This expertise is quite relative though. Recruits, especially second and third generation Islamic immigrants in Western Europe, usually have a limited knowledge of Islamic belief, therefore a recruiter can quite easily achieve a religious-political dominance” (op.cit: 12).

Leadership and group bonding are critical elements in the radicalisation process. According to Lorenzo Vidino, home grown Islamist radicalism is “often developing when a small group of childhood friends who have embraced radical Islam join with an older and charismatic figure” (Vidino 2007: 579). Charismatic leaders naturally attract individuals willing to emulate their actions and young persons are particularly vulnerable.
However, the presence of a natural leader or charismatic person does not have to be a prerequisite for radicalisation. Recent terrorist cases like the London bombing and research by Sageman indicate that for some radicalisation can be seen as bottom-up process in which the candidates are highly motivated, ambitious and applying themselves for Jihad. There is no need for a recruiter to persuade potential recruits (Sageman 2004, Kirby 2007). What characterises these individuals and the group are especially group bonding and cohesion. Sageman describes the establishment of cliques as the mechanism to turn violent thoughts into action: “Cliques literally transform lives and, in so doing, change the meaning and impact of friendship bonds that pave the way to joining the Jihad” (Sageman 2004: 154-155).

**In summary**

- Foreign policy issues such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to be major drivers/triggers of recruitment for the radicalisation process by creating anger and resentment.

- Isolated incidents such as the cartoon crisis have shown that a single provocative issue can create worldwide outrage and may even motivate some individuals to become radicalised.

- The ideology of radical Islam appears to be giving young people, who are wanting to do something against perceived Western wrongdoings, a “legitimate” cause of action and excuse to act.

- The presence of a charismatic person, a radical preacher or a natural leader seems to have been a common factor for many terrorists and individuals who have gone down the road of Islamist radicalisation. Generally the individuals are motivated, self recruiting and display a high degree of group identity.

- It is important to note that trigger factors have to be seen in a context. They are only indicative.
10. Opportunity factors

Different venues or locations provide a setting for radicalisation by offering an opportunity to meet likeminded people, by giving inspiration or serving as a recruiting ground for radicalisers.

The most common places are:

- The Internet and satellite channels
- Prison
- The Mosque
- School, university, youth clubs or work
- Sporting activities

The characteristics of each of the major opportunity factors\textsuperscript{31} are described below:

**The Internet**

In terror cases such as the Madrid and London bombings, the Hofstad network and cases in Germany and Denmark, the role of the Internet has been a significant facilitating factor in the radicalisation process (AVID 2006: 47-50; House of Commons report 2006: 16; NCTb 2007). For example, the Spanish indictment of the Madrid train bombers identified more than 50 electronic books that had been downloaded from the Internet and were found on the hard drives of the bombers’ computers (Felter 2007: 4). Data seized from the Hofstad group contained military manuals downloaded from the Internet and information on how to deal with arrests and interrogation (NCTb 2007: 83-85).\textsuperscript{32} The two people who planned to blow up two German trains in July 2006 became radicals after their arrival in Germany, as a result of propaganda on the Internet. The bombs were primarily made of instructions found on the Internet (op.cit. 2007: 94).

Although the report on the London attacks did not reveal to what extent the Internet was used for the operation, it states that the recipes for the homemade bombs would have been available through open sources (House of Commons report 2006: 23). Another example is Jermaine Lindsay’s “purchases of perfume, which he then traded on the internet for material useful for the bomb-making process” (op.cit: 25).

\textsuperscript{31} These are all locations that can serve as greenhouses for radicalisation but cafes, bookstores or other meeting places can also be venues for radicalisation.

\textsuperscript{32} Members of the Hofstad group set up their own web pages under names like “5343” or “Tawheed wal Jihad” in order to publish text with Jihadi content and, often with the active help of women as translators (NCTb 2007: 63-64).
Using the Internet is cheap, it has global reach, it allows for rapid dissemination of text and video in order to spread propaganda, threats\textsuperscript{33} or claim responsibility for attacks. Furthermore, the Internet is anonymous and serves as a platform for contacts, communication and information sharing for both males and females. Propaganda can be circulated widely without any significant contradiction or a third party filter. A typical message sent out is that Islam is under siege and that Muslims have a personal duty to commit violence in defense of Islam.\textsuperscript{34}

Besides being used for propaganda, a meeting place and vehicle for spreading the message of radical Islam in the pre-radicalisation phase, the Internet is also used in ways, which are of particular relevance in the later phases of radicalisation. These include provision of training manuals and manuals on explosives.\textsuperscript{35}

Several of the Internet’s operational features make detection by law enforcement agencies difficult. These include:

- **Dead drops:** An e-mail message is saved as a draft rather than being sent. Anyone with access can log in and read the message. This way the message is less likely to be intercepted by intelligence authorities.
- **Parasiting:** Training manuals are hidden deep inside seemingly innocent subdirectories on legitimate web pages.
- **Research:** Terrorists can research potential targets online, using both text and imagery.
- **Fundraising:** Terrorists can launch their appeals for donations anonymously.

An exact figure is hard to come by but according to the FBI most estimates find that there are approximately 5,000-6,000 extremist web pages on the Internet (Mueller 2006). The majority of these websites are either mirrored versions of existing sites, or simply bulletin board pages.

\textsuperscript{33} For instance during the cartoon crisis several Internet threats against Denmark were issued on Islamist home pages.

\textsuperscript{34} People such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abd al-Qadir ibn Abd al-Aziz and Abu Qatada al-Filistini are seen by the US as thought leaders of Al Qaida who inspire terrorist attacks, rather than Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri (Felter 2007: 4). See also appendix 1.

boards that disseminate material that originated from terrorist organisations. Once material has been published, it is immediately duplicated on a large number of sites located on servers across the globe (Doran 2007: 1).

A typical pattern in the pre-radicalisation and conversion phase is that information is exchanged freely and openly on the Internet. People either visit extremist homepages, download videos, text, terrorist journals\(^{36}\), songs or go to chat rooms\(^{37}\) to discuss religious subjects with other persons. In later stages of radicalisation communication gets more secretive, persons might continue discussions in smaller bilateral chat sessions and encrypted information might be used. According to the AIVD, such bilateral sessions are often focused on recruitment and persons might be introduced to a charismatic Muslim person (AIVD 2006: 48).

By giving easy access to radical Islam and the opportunity to create local and international contacts, the Internet is playing a major role in all the phases of the radicalisation process from pre-radicalisation to operations. The Internet has removed the practical barrier to entering terrorism thus making it easier. A recent empirical study of 242 European Jihadists from 2001-2006, on the effects on the Internet on radicalisation found that there is a correlation between propaganda on the Internet and rapid radicalisation (Bakker 2007).

However, the idea of someone being able to go through the full circle of radicalisation, from pre-radicalisation to committing an actual terror act, just by using the Internet, is unlikely. Likewise, someone who is merely visiting radical home pages does not have to turn out to be a terrorist. Examples of self-radicalisation of isolated persons who have downloaded bomb-making instructions on the Internet and carried out planning and/or attacks do exist.\(^{38}\) However, “the reality is that there is a strong correlation between sophistication of a terrorist attack and the degree to which its perpetrators were able to capitalise on the finance, weapons, training and skill provided through existing structures” (Neumann 2006: 77).

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\(^{36}\) Examples are titles like: Al Battar, Afghanistan Mujahedin and Kuhtab Al Battar.

\(^{37}\) A chat room is a virtual room where people can communicate in real time while on the Internet. Users type their messages with a keyboard and the entered text will appear on the monitor, along with the text of the other chat room visitors.

\(^{38}\) Sas van Gent was arrested in the Netherlands in 2004 for threatening Hirsi Ali, MP and the AIVD. Apparently he went through the radicalisation cycle by just sitting in front of his PC (AIVD 2006: 49, AIVD 2007).
Recent terrorist attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London were all associated with the Internet although the perpetrators also had physical contact with other groups and persons, had developed international links to persons with fighting experience and two of the London bombers even went on training camps in Pakistan. This indicates that, although the Internet is a facilitating factor in all the phases of the radicalisation process, it is not a sufficient factor in explaining home grown terrorism. Personal contacts and links are also necessary.

**Satellite channels**

Satellite TV works in many of the same ways as the Internet. It is easily accessible, it allows the rapid dissemination of video and audio files and it allows anonymous communication with the global community of Islam. Broadcasts are often in English or have English subtitles and sometimes video and audio tapes are translated into Kurdish, French and German (Felter 2007). The purpose is to reach as large a community as possible, especially in the non-Muslim world. Satellite channels include Al Jazerra and Hezbollah's satellite channel, al-Manar.

According to the FBI Director, Robert Muller, the media company of Al Qaida, Al-Sahab, released 48 videos in 2006 (the largest number in one year). This acceleration is seen by the FBI as intended to mobilise the global Jihad movement and demonstrate that Al Qaida remains relevant and is its main ideological driver (Mueller 2006). Other groups also have their own media outlets and, like Al Sahab and the Global Islamic Media Front (another media outlet used by Al Qaida), they show interviews and speeches given by radical leaders and pictures of attacks on coalition forces in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples of these media outlets are the al-Furgan Media Production Company and Voice of Jihad of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Europol 2007: 25).

Satellite channels are providing access to broad streams of Islamist propaganda. For example, suicide statements such as those from Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer are often issued through satellite channels. The same goes for statements from al-Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden. By showing videos and text of radical Islam over and over
again the channels play a role in the radicalisation process and have the potential to reach a large population of mostly young Muslims looking for answers.\textsuperscript{39}

In general, the messages of radical Islam and the stories of “clash of civilizations” delivered on the Internet or through satellite channels have the potential to create a culture or world view among young Muslims that justifies Jihad or acts of terrorism against the West. The Internet has a capability to further radicalisation by creating links between extremists located around the world or in other regions and serves as a virtual network in which to obtain knowledge, skills training and reconnaissance. Whilst satellite channels can be vehicles of propaganda and present images that contribute to the creation of a common perception of reality for a very large audience.\textsuperscript{40}

These new media are giving many European Muslims a feeling that they belong to a broader Muslim community. As discussed earlier use of the Internet and watching Arabic TV channels does not have to lead to radicalisation but for a minor proportion of society both can be facilitating factors in the radicalisation process.

**Prisons**
For a long time prisons have been known to be places of radicalisation. This is primarily due to the special circumstances in prisons where individuals are isolated from society, family and friends. Prisons are “crisis” environments that create a desire for belonging, group identity, protection and religious guidance. Furthermore, it is a place where extremists can establish contacts with fellow criminals.

Historical examples of prison radicalisation include Sayyid Qutb who wrote his influential radical book “Milestones” while in an Egyptian prison and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who, during his imprisonment in Jordan, became a powerful leader who recruited followers in prison (HSPI/CIAG 2006). Another example is Muktar Said Ibrahim, one of the 21 July bombers, who served time in five juvenile jails. One of these jails, Feltham Young Offender Institution, was where shoe bomber, Richard Reid, had earlier converted to Islam

\textsuperscript{39} According to Gijs de Vries, European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, satellite channels that disseminate terrorist propaganda and anti-Semitic hate speech are seen as a real threat by the EU. Therefore such transmission is banned in Europe (de Vries 2006: 7).

\textsuperscript{40} In Germany “the growth of digital television has made a host of Turkish- and Arabic-language channels available, intensifying language problems and nurturing identities that are informed more by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the war in Iraq than by the local German environment” (Bennhold 2005).
(Time/CNN 31 July 2005). In 2004 members of the group "Martyrs for Morocco" were arrested for intending to blow up Spain’s national criminal court. The leader, Mohamed Achraf, set up the group during his imprisonment from 1999 to 2002, when he was serving time for credit card fraud. Neither he nor the rest of the group had had any prior involvement with Islamist extremism (BBC News 21 March 2006).

Without establishing a direct link between being in prison and becoming radicalised, it is interesting to note the study by Bakker (2007) of 246 European Jihadists which shows that a large proportion of these Jihadists where former criminals. No solid data exists on how many people are becoming radicalised in prison, but the FBI assesses prisons as fertile ground for extremists since inmates “may be drawn to an extreme form of Islam because it might help justify their violent tendencies” (Mueller 2006).

On the other hand, research by Spalek and El-Hassan (2007) has shown that people who convert to Islam in prisons are not necessarily radicalised. Instead, Islam is used to provide a moral framework from which to re-build their lives or gain security within the hard prison environment (by belonging to a group). According to the study, Islam seems to help prisoners to cope better with the prison environment, reducing their propensity to aggression and violence.

However, it is the assessment of most intelligence services that prisons serve as a potential hotbed for radicalisation and individuals can become radicalised whilst in prison (MI5 2006; AIVD 2002).

Young persons seem to be particularly vulnerable to radical Islamism in prisons. According to the AIVD, Muslim youth who are deprived of their freedom “display a striking receptivity” for radical Islam (AIVD 2002: 16). Prison Imams and influential inmates play a significant role since they have the potential to influence the mindset and belief system of other inmates by speaking from a position of authority on religious issues (Van Duyn 2006).

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41 Like the imprisoned RAF members in Germany in the 1970s it is possible that detained Jihadists might become symbols of the fight against the West and be able to inspiring receptive young people outside of prisons.

42 In France there are examples of radicals who seek to get arrested on purpose so that they can recruit new militants in jail (Vidino 2005: 27).
A common phenomenon in many prisons is the lack of qualified Muslim clerics. In France, Muslims represent more than half of the country’s 60,000 prisoners, but in June 2005 there were only 69 Imams active in prisons, compared to 513 Catholic priests (Moniquet 2006: 16). In Denmark, no statistics are available on the inmates’ faiths, but approximately 18% of the total prison population is constituted by immigrants, second generation immigrants, descendants and foreigners (Prison and Probation Service 2006: 26). Only one prison Imam is working full time and three part time (Espersen 2006) while 17 Christian priests are working full time in closed facilities (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs 2005: 9). In the UK, Muslims constitute 8% of the prison population (2004) and prison Imams are generally associated with those prisons which have many Muslim inmates, although there are large discrepancies to be found at different prisons (Spalek and Al-Hassan 2006; Spalek 2005).

In the absence of certified or qualified Muslim preachers, inmates themselves are often allowed to act as spiritual leaders. In this regard, individuals who do not have prior knowledge of Islam are especially vulnerable to a distorted image of Islam. Prison gangs may also adopt “jailhouse Islam” which is a form of Islam that incorporates values of gang loyalty and violence (HSPI/CIAG 2006: ii). Often prisoners who have a radical interpretation of Islam tend not to recognize the authority of prison Imams, either because their views are not radical enough or they are perceived as representing the official prison system.

However, contrary to the stereotype of a prison Imam as someone who preaches extremist versions of Islam and incites radicalisation, recent research, based on interviews with 170 prisoners in the UK, has found no specific evidence that Muslim chaplains are behaving or preaching in a way that facilitates radicalisation (Marranci 2007: 6). According to this research, young Muslims are radicalised by the prison system itself, rather than by Imams. The study reveals that security policies within prisons, including restricting praying in communal spaces, suspension of access to certain TV programs, newspapers and prohibiting reading of the Koran during work breaks, are exacerbating, rather than suppressing the radicalisation process (op.cit. 2007). It is a tendency that is confirmed by Spalek (2005: 2), who found that the lack of washing facilities close to prayer rooms, the quality (authenticity) or lack of halal food, ignorance of the spiritual and practical aspects of Islam by prison staff and limited time for prayers are frequent sources of frustration.

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43 In addition, the Danish Prison and Probation Service are using volunteers.
The picture of prison radicalisation is complex. There is no automatic link between radicalisation and prison Imams or, for that matter, conversion or re-awakening to Islam. For some prisoners the sense of frustration, discrimination and depression created by being in prison can make them receptive of radical Islam. An important question is what happens to prisoners, who have either converted or become attracted to radical Islam in prison, when they are released back into society. Without any practical or spiritual support upon leaving prison, they might be attracted to a life of crime or even go further down the path of radicalisation.

The Mosque
For Muslims the mosque environment has traditionally been a place of worship and community building and a reference to the cultural heritage of the homeland. The majority of Mosques are by no means radical or places where young persons are recruited for Jihad or violent action. However, a few mosques have been associated with extremism especially in the 1990s. Examples are the Finsbury Mosque in London and the Fourqaan Mosque in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. Evidence suggests that extremists are increasingly moving away from Mosques to conduct their activities in private homes or other premises to avoid detection (House of Common report 2006; AIVD 2005; AIVD 2006: 16).

While many young Muslims begin to take an interest in Islam as teenagers they do not necessarily turn to the local Mosque for guidance and answers (Mirza et al. 2007: 40). The established Mosque environment is often seen as representing their parents’ generation, and no having a role to play in easing tensions or helping integration nor is it seen to pay attention to political issues. Imams often have no knowledge of the societies in which their followers live and often they do not speak the local language (Moniquet 2005: 4).

The leader of the Muslim Parliament in the UK, Dr. Ghayassudin Siddiqui, has highlighted the problems associated with Mosques and youth the following way: “Most Mosques are not equipped to deal with young people (many mosque still do not allow women to use mosque facilities). They do not have the staff equipped with Islamic knowledge, experience and professionalism. Young people have drifted away either because they were banned to discuss controversial issues in the mosque or found nothing inspiring on offer there. Our

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44 The interaction between persons who are radicalised and criminals raises the danger that they might benefit from these criminal networks in order to get access to weapons, operational skills, logistics and explosives in the future (AIVD 2006: 62).
mosques are largely tribal and controlled by old men on-the-dole with no understanding of the changing world around them. Expansion of mosque activities could have provided the opportunity to many young men and women to become involved in youth projects. The unwelcoming and suffocating atmosphere within mosques did not allow this to happen. Many radical and active young people began drifting away organising themselves outside the influence of the mosque structure. Some regrettably came under the influence of those promoting ‘wahabist/Jihadist ideology’ (Siddiqui 2005).

Even though Mosques might not be major places for radicalisation, attending Mosques associated with extremism can be seen as a contributing factor in the pre-radicalisation process. For instance when extremists are spotting potential candidates at the margins of the mosque environment (House of Commons report 2006: 31).

Travelling guest preachers may constitute a separate problem since they have been seen to propagate radical Islamist views (AIVD 2005a). However, the majority of Mosques are moderate and are banning people with radical views from their circles. Only a small number of Mosques can be seen as potential gateways to further radicalisation (NCTb 2007: 10) and often they will be well known to the security services.

A study of 115 Danish Mosques has shown that outspoken radical interpretations of Islam are extremely rare and Danish Mosques are primarily used as social forums or meeting places for people wanting to speak their mother tongue or read papers from the homeland (Kühle 2006).

In recent terror cases in Europe, most of the terrorists had not been particularly religious before becoming involved in a radicalisation process. Many had, however, some kind of association with the local Mosque:

- The 7/7 bombers in the UK all visited Mosques in the immediate area of where they were living as well as Mosques further away (House of Commons report 2006: 16; 18). For example, Mohammad Sidique Khan chose to belong to the Stratford Street

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45 Early in 2002, the Netherlands was confronted with recruitment activities by foreign recruiters. Two youths from Eindhoven with a Moroccan background were recruited for Jihad by a network of recruiters from North Africa operating in, and around, the Al Fourqaan Mosque in Eindhoven (AIVD 2006: 27).

46 However, in the UK it has raised concern that the Deobandi school of Islam apparently runs more than 600 of Britain’s 1,350 mosques, according to a police report seen by The Times (Norfolk 2007).
Mosque. A Mosque, which followed the more rigid and orthodox Deobandi school of Islam (NYPD 2007: 34).

• Many of the UK fertiliser plotters were not particularly religious before entering the radicalisation process. However, Waheed Mahmood first met Omar Khyam, the man at the centre of the conspiracy, at the local Mosque (BBC news 2007).

• Several of the participants in the 21/7 plot in London attended the Finsbury Park Mosque to hear, the now jailed, radical preacher Abu Hamza.

• Mohamad Bouyeri, of the Hofstad group, was attending the El-Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam, known for its radical preaching (Fuller 2004).

• In the Danish Glostrup case, three of the four original suspects had traveled to London to visit Omar Bakri Muhammad who led the led Al-Muhajiroun, an Islamist organisation based in the United Kingdom, until its disbandment in 2004 (TV2 nyhederne 14 February 2007). They also attended the same Mosque in Copenhagen.

• Kafeel Ahmed, the Indian doctor who died from burns after trying to set off a car bomb at Glasgow Airport, is said to have received his initial radicalisation at a Tablighi Jamaat Mosque (Norfolk 2007a).

It appears that the Mosque is playing a role in the pre-radicalisation phase as an initial meeting place and recruiting venue. However, the increased focus of intelligence services, initiatives in Muslim circles to resist extremism and the banning of radical preachers have had the effect that mosques are not the main hotspots for radicalisation. Instead, radicalised individuals are withdrawing from the mosque environment to carry out meetings in private homes, bookshops, cafes etc. For instance, the preacher who had a large impact on the Hofstad network “urged young people to abandon the Mosque in favour of home-based religious instruction, where they could be mentally prepared for the violent Jihad” (NCTb 2007: 2). By isolating young people from the general Muslim community, recruiters are given freedom to groom potential Jihadist without encountering opposing opinions.

Another pre-radicalisation pattern is seen when young Muslims attend religious instruction classes in regular non-radical Mosques. After a while some come to consider these classes as insufficient and start looking for (more radical) places outside the Mosque hier-

47 Literally, the preaching party.
archy (AIVD 2006: 27). These informal communities have been termed the “Islam of cellars and garages”.

Finally, organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir, who denounces democratic politics and backs the introduction of Sharia law (and is banned in several countries), also offer alternatives to young people who are seeking a more radical Islam or a return to a “purer” Islam. However, while membership or sympathy with such an organisation in no way entails a willingness to carry out terrorism, it might indicate a probability of some members being receptive to a more radical doctrine (see Husain 2007).

**School, university, youth clubs, bookshops, workplace and sporting activities**

Besides encounters in the Mosque or prison environment, the initial radicalisation path can also take place in different social settings like school, clubs, workplace or during sporting activities. What these activities have in common is the personal contact among friends or likeminded persons.

Universities and schools appear to be particularly relevant places of radicalisation, especially dormitories. Campuses are seen as places full of young people who are interested in ideas. In the UK, radicalisation on campuses is a growing problem. According to a report by the Social Research Unit in the UK at 24 institutions, including some of the most high-profile universities in the UK, extremist and/or terror groups had been detected (Glees and Pope 2005). Individuals seen as vulnerable to indoctrination are being targeted. Some institutions are beginning to address this issue, for example, London’s Metropolitan University has appointed a respected, moderate Imam to tackle the problem (Gardner 2005). At universities, especially Muslim student organisations seem have a strong influence as forums for the development and recruitment of likeminded individuals (NYPD 2007; Husain 2007).

For groups like the UK based Al-Muhajiroun, Muslim university students constitute the most important recruitment pool, because they are believed to be suffering from a lack of social mobility: “they face a discriminatory system that prevents them from realising their

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48 Hizb ut-Tahrir insists it opposes violence and has condemned bombings in London, Madrid and Bali (see the homepage of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain: http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb). Nevertheless, violent agitation has been associated with the party. For example on 23 October 2002, a Danish court handed down a 60-day suspended sentence to Fadi Abdelatif, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s spokesperson in Denmark, after he was found guilty of distributing anti-Jewish racist propaganda. The title of a leaflet he distributed was a quote from the Quran: “And kill them wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out.”
potential. They grew up in Britain but are not considered British by many in society” (Wiktorkowicz 2005: 91).

Youth clubs, gyms, sporting clubs, workplaces and the social life associated with these places are other venues for radicalisation. The 7/7 London bombers, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain frequented the local gym and a youth club, where Khan gave talks (House of Commons report 2006: 15-16). At the local youth club, Jihad was an often discussed topic and extremist used the venue to spread their radical message (NYPD 2007: 33). Islamic bookshops also seem to play a role in the radicalisation process. At the local bookshop in Beeston the 7/7 bombers held study circles (Waldman 2005).

These informal social networks appear to provide an environment that is conducive to radicalisation. They provide an opportunity for radicalisation and might serve as incubators for further radicalisation. Often they are the first places where individuals can meet likeminded persons, and be exposed to Islamist extremism. Moreover, one must not underestimate the effect of boredom and identity seeking for young people.

**In summary**

- Initial radicalisation often takes place in settings like the Mosque, through the Internet, satellite channels, schools, universities, youth clubs, work, prison, sporting activities, cafes etc. What most of these activities have in common is the personal contact among friends or likeminded persons that they offer.
- The Mosque is playing a role in the pre-radicalisation phase but it appears that Mosques are not the main hotspots for radicalisation. Prisons are potential hotbeds for radicalisation. It is a “crisis” environment, that creates a desire for belonging, group identity, protection and religious guidance.
- Radicalised individuals may withdraw from the Mosque environment to carry out meetings in private homes or other places.
- The Internet is playing a major role in all the phases of the radicalisation process, from pre-radicalisation to operations. It is supplying the opportunity to create local and international contacts and disseminate information.
11. Advanced radicalisation

At the critical phase 3 to 4 overseas travel, training and attack planning are catalysts in the radicalisation process. Indoctrination becomes even more prevalent and group identity is the central focus point for the individuals involved. In comparison with the other phases of the radicalisation process, it important to note that the final phase leading to an attack can occur quickly and without warning. In some cases, this stage takes as little as a couple of weeks to complete (NYPD 2007: 43).

Training and paramilitary activities at home
Camping, martial arts or paramilitary activities such as white-water rafting and paint-ball, are used to strengthen the commitment of the group. It is part of an effort to enhance group bonding and solidarity but also to single out who has the right character and commitment for further action. In this regard, these activities serve as a vetting opportunity.

For example, two of the 7 July London bombers rode the rapids at Canolfan Tryweryn, the National White Water Centre, in North Wales weeks before the attack (House of Commons report 2006: 17; BBC 25 July 2005). Two of these bombers, Khan and Tanweer were known to have attended a camping trip in the UK with others in April 2003 (House of Commons report 2006).

Khan also participated in paintball sessions with other youths in 2002. “These events served as bonding and vetting opportunities and were often preceded by Islamist themed lectures. It is believed that through one of these outings, Khan met Jermaine Lindsay” (NYPD 2007: 41).

Overseas travel
Overseas travel serves as another catalyst for action. Popular destinations seem to be Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Kashmir. The purpose appears to be ideological reinforcement and acquiring practical operational capability. For some it might be an aspiration to fight in an actual war zone, although many people are redirected back to their home countries. It is often the leaders of terrorist groups, who travel abroad. Both Khan and Tanweer of the 7/7 London bombers visited Pakistan. In 2003, Khan probably received training in Pakistan, and, from November 2004 to February 2005, Khan and Tanweer were in Pakistan,
probably to receive training or transiting to Afghanistan to fight, although no firm evidence of this has been established (House of Commons report 2006: 20).

In 2002 Samir Azzouz, from the Hofstad group, attempted to join Islamic fighters in Chechnya (Crawford 2004) and Jason Walters, from the same group, is believed to have been in Pakistan in 2003 (Vermaat 2005).

The ringleader of the alleged 2007 bomb plot in Germany, a convert to Islam called Fritz Gelowicz, reportedly went to Arabic language training in Syria and terrorist training in the border regions of Pakistan at a camp run by the Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union (Ash 2007).

A further example is the ringleader of the UK fertiliser plot, Omar Khyam, who visited Pakistan several times. In 2000, he attended a Mujahideen training camp and in 2003, he visited Pakistan again. He probably wanted to go to Afghanistan to fight but ended up organising training camps. The rest of this group, Waheed Mahmood, Khawaja Garcia and Shujah Mahmood Akbar, also visited Pakistan in 2003. At two training camps several of the involved in this plot learned how to use weapons and make explosives (BBC 2007a).

Although overseas travel appears to be the final catalyst for group action it is important to underline that overseas visits are not necessary for engaging in terrorist activities. Bouyeri (Hofstad), Abu Lifa (Glostrup case) and others have not travelled overseas.

**Planning and execution**

The actual effectuation of a terrorist attack is the last phase of the radicalisation process. It is likely to include:

- Research on the Internet for bomb manuals or target selection.
- Acquisition of bomb material such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hydrochloric, sulphuric acid, hexamine or other chemicals. (Often bombs are made from material commercially available and the production of bomb devices do not cost much).
- Reconnaissance of target and dry run or test explosions.

During this final phase, group members are likely to become more security aware and try not to draw attention to themselves by the way they dress or behave. In order to prepare
themselves mentally for the final action, they might also watch graphic Jihad videos or view extremist home pages.

**In summary**

- Advanced radicalisation is often associated with catalysts like overseas travel, training and attack planning.
- Training provides group bonding and commitment as well as vetting opportunities.
- A trip overseas may give the final motivation and also operational capacity for carrying out an attack.
- Try not to draw attention to themselves (aware of behaviour and their appearance).
- Only an extremely small group of people progresses to the final phases of the radicalisation ladder.
12. Prevention and counter radicalisation strategies

Preventing Islamist extremism and radicalisation is extremely complex and difficult. There is no simple cause and effect. The perpetrators come from all areas of society and there is no typical terrorist profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. However, as described above, several indicators may nevertheless be used as pointers of a radicalisation pattern. Group bonding, certain behavioural characteristics and the existence of a spiritual leader appear to be of particular relevance, but many other factors apply.

Home grown terrorism can largely be viewed as a basic sociological phenomenon where issues like belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in the transformation process. Religion, as such, plays an important role, but for some it probably rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals.

Since 9/11, many intelligence and security services have received more staff and funds, undergone reforms and been given new legislative powers to intervene or prevent people from committing acts of terrorism. However, governments have increasingly realised the necessity of having a non-security based approach for countering the problem of radicalisation. “Hard” security and policing methods are often complemented by more “soft” preventive and community orientated approaches (see appendix 2 and figure 3).

Figure 3: Focus area of counter radicalisation and counter terrorism

The most effective counter radicalisation strategy is to block mainly young people or recruits from entering in the first place. “Once an individual is in the grip of the terrorist group the power of the group and organizational psychology will increasingly dominate his psychology” (Post 2005: 634).
Preventive measures

Based on the model of radicalisation described above, four components are suggested as methods of tackling radicalisation.

- Societal measures
- Counter-ideology
- Public diplomacy
- Policing and community involvement

The essential role of local communities and dialogue in tackling radicalisation is common to all these components. These measures are intended to focus on all phases and catalysts of the radicalisation process: background, trigger and opportunity factors. Different strategies need to be applied to those already radicalised and those that are at risk of entering the process.

When applying counter measures, it should be considered not to treat Muslims differently than the rest of the population or as vulnerable group who has special rights. Society should accommodate pragmatically to different cultural needs but special rights are probably only likely to reinforce feelings of victimisation, alienation and a sense of not being part of society. Differences should not be institutionalised. Instead, governments have to engage with Muslims as equal citizens, and not through their religious identity, in order to create a sense of communality and shared values (Mirza 2007: 7; 87-95).

Likewise, it is critical for prevention measures to understand the differences within the Muslim community. The community is not a homogenous group with a single voice or representative. For example, women and young people seem to be under-represented in the majority of community structures.

The following attempts to describe each of the four counter prevention measures including suggestions for further action.

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49 In a similar way a recent Danish interview book has concluded that practices like having for instance so-called girls meeting groups or allowing children to be exempted from parts of the school curriculum only reinforces a feeling of being apart and signalling that Western values like equality and democracy are less relevant (Aamand and Uddin 2007).
Societal measures

As recent terrorist cases have demonstrated it is not possible to establish a causal link between social deprivation or socio-economic factors and extremism. Integrated, well-educated middle class individuals with good jobs, families and children have been involved in several of the recent terror plots in Europe. However, persons from marginalised sections of society have also been implicated in terror plots and while an individual may not be disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as less well off.

The vast majority of Muslims do not become terrorists even though they may share many of the same background factors as extremists, such as having identity problems and experiencing Islamophobia and racism. However, this is not to say that background factors are insignificant. They might have an effect and make individuals think about how they fit into a Western society and what it means to be a Muslim in non-Muslim countries.

Most Western governments have ethnic integration policies in order to provide opportunities for education, jobs and housing to ethnic minorities. The policies differ but essentially they are aimed at tackling disadvantage, social exclusion and promote integration (see appendix 2). However, it is interesting to note that the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark are countries known for their integration and multicultural policies and nevertheless they are among those countries in Europe with the most significant problems with home grown terrorism. As mentioned, there may not be a direct link between socio-economic factors and extremism, but it appears to be sensible to supplement classical socio-economic policies with societal measures, which attend to the identity crisis among second and third generation immigrants and increase a sense of belonging to society.

Governments should try to prevent public misunderstanding and hostility towards Muslims. Methods of doing so including being aware of the potential for messages to be distorted and misunderstood in the communication process. Inflammatory rhetoric about Muslims as a group such as terms like “war on terrorism” or “Muslim terrorists” should be avoided.

Furthermore, ethnic role models could be promoted in different areas of society to demonstrate that Muslims and other ethnic groups can have social mobility and succeed in areas such as society, business and education. Actions such as using people from mixed eth-
nic backgrounds on public posters and in advertisements signal that ethnic groups are a regular part of society.

Road shows by relevant ministers, such as the ones, which have taken place in the UK and Denmark, are one way to engage with Muslim youth and signal that governments have an interest in the daily lives and problems of Muslims. Mainstream Muslim television, radio and newspapers could also be encouraged to provide a more balanced view of life in Western societies (e.g. by government personnel giving them stories and interviews).

Finally, in order to avoid Islamophobia and separatism, public policy need to be careful not to let a few individuals taint the entire community. Major efforts should be targeted towards the majority, rather than a small minority.

**Counter ideology**

The pull of extremist groups mirrors, in part, how traditional institutions and the Muslim community have failed to offer an effective counter narrative towards radical Islam. Although the picture is slowly changing, there are still relatively few moderate Muslims who speak out openly against Islamism, who isolate extremists and challenge the positions of radical interpretations of Islam or defensive Muslim leaders.

This relative absence of a critical Muslim debate about militant Islamism risks reinforcing the trend for young people to turn to religion as a way to gain an identity and achieve a sense of belonging.

Moderate religious institutions and Muslim organisations must be able to connect to young people, address their questions, needs and concerns. However, it is essential that the institutions, NGOs, Imams, student organisations and spokespersons are not seen as being “used” or “bought” by the majority of society. Government involvement should be minimised, but in order to have an effective impact partnerships are needed with government agencies, police and other community organisations.

The schooling system, both primary and high school, also has a crucial role to play in confronting misperception and myths. Knowledge about Islam, its history and role today could be conveyed in many areas of the school curriculum including history, literature and art.
This will give a better foundation for countering extremist thoughts for young receptive individuals, who are not well founded in Islam.

Furthermore, after-school activities should be better able to detect and spot young persons who are being influenced by extremism. The British “Street” project is a good example of a Muslim community initiative in London that is offering 24/7 counselling and activities designed to counter the adverse impact of extremist and terrorist propaganda on a receptive youth. Released prisoners are also helped to integrate back into society through this institution (Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsbrough 2006: 76). These kinds of community projects can offer a sense of belonging and a feeling of inclusiveness in a social framework. Youth workers are often more in touch with youth in the street, at clubs and gyms rather than traditional Muslim leaders or Imams. Having “street cred” can help individuals build a bridge between being a Muslim and belonging to a Western society (Wilton Park 2006: 10). Youth wings attached to Mosques and staffed by youth workers could also be considered as a means of providing support for young people.

Counter-ideology will naturally have to address religious understanding, e.g. emphasising that Islam is not about anti-Western ideas, violence and suicide bombings. However, care is needed when stressing religion in engagement with young people, because it risks reinforcing perceptions of difference. Instead, there is a need to create a more collective identity and community feeling within society. Counter-ideology will also have to include non-Islamic ideas and Western values like equality, freedom of speech etc. As stated by Ian Blair, head of the London Metropolitan Police “We will only defeat it if we have a motivating idea that is better than their ideas” (Perlez 2007).

In this regard, development of more “home grown” Imams could be encouraged, while at the same time raising the qualifications of existing Imams. This will bring forward representatives who speak the local language and have a deeper understanding of the society. However, in the long run it is essential to involve new members of the Muslim communities, not necessarily traditional leaders. In the short term, Mosque leaders must ensure that all material which preaches hate or segregation is removed from the Mosque. It is interesting to note that several countries including Spain, France and Italy, have introduced controls over foreign money flowing to Mosques (e.g. Saudi Arabian funds). It is a measure that might be worth considering in other countries (MacEion 2007: 170).
Likewise, major outlets of Islamist propaganda such as the Internet and satellite TV are to be targeted. This is already happening today by outlawing Jihad-CDs and incitement to violence. In some cases, countries even take down radical websites (see appendix 2). The challenge is, however, extraordinarily difficult since web servers can be located anywhere in the world and can easily put up material again with short notice elsewhere. The same goes for the reception of satellite-TV channels which is equally difficult to curb. Governments could, as an alternative, consider setting up web pages offering a counter narrative to radical Islam. For instance, web pages containing statements from respected present day scholars like Tariq Ramadan as well as moderate viewpoints from classical scholars like Ibn Taymiyya. Taymiyya is usually believed to be a major inspiration for the Islamist movement, however, in his works one can find many opinions that could be used to counter extremism (Hassan 2006: 539). In addition, statements from those who have renounced their extremist past like Ed Husain (2007), former Hizb-ut-Tahrir member, or others who have left the radical movement, could be very useful in immunising the wider Muslim population against extremism or even de-radicalising young individuals.

It is worth noting that, Muslim populations are increasingly rejecting some of the major ideas behind radical Islam. WorldPublicOpinion.org found in April 2007 that large majorities in Egypt (88 percent), Indonesia (65 percent) and Morocco (66 percent) agree that: "Groups that use violence against civilians, such as Al Qaida, are violating the principles of Islam. Islam opposes the use of such violence". These shifts in attitude are beginning to show up in actions (Hughes 2007).

A very interesting Muslim community initiative (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, MINAP) in the UK has proposed minimum standards for Islamic institutions. The standards include counter-extremism programmes, community relations schemes, support

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50 Ramadan is argues that: “Western Muslims must develop a critical discourse that rejects victimhood, and that criticises radical or literal readings of religious teachings. It is also important not to conflate or confuse religion with separate debates: social problems are not religious problems and have nothing to do with Islam as such. Muslims have a responsibility to be fully engaged in helping to reconcile the societies in which they live with the proclaimed ideals of those societies.” (Tariq Ramadan, The Independent 6 July 2006).

51 Saudi Arabia has been praised by some for creating centres, to ‘reprogramme’ extremist Imams and also to turn would-be Jihadists away from violence. See Christopher Boucek, ‘Extremist Re-education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia’, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, issue 16 (16 August 2007). The Saudi program seeks to de-radicalize extremist sympathisers by engaging them in intensive religious debate and psychological counselling. In Indonesia key elements of a de-radicalisation programme involve getting to know individual prisoners and responding to their specific concerns, often relating to economic needs of their families, as well as constant communication and attention (ICG 2007).

52 Hughes was at that time US undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs.
and proper conditions for Imams and greater condemnation of "un-Islamic" activity (BBC 29 November 2007). MINAP wants to have the possibility to make unannounced visits to check standards. Some of the proposed Mosque standards are:

- Democratic and accountable
- Transparent finances
- Open to women and youth
- Counter-extremism programs
- Inter-faith schemes
- Work against forced marriage

Counter-ideology is unlikely to persuade the most hardened extremists, who have reached phases 3 and 4 in the radicalisation process, but the purpose is rather to prevent new young recruits, who are most likely to be able to be intercepted in phases 1 and 2.

**Policing and community intelligence**

Research and lessons learned from police work with counter-radicalisation suggest that local communities are essential for efficient counter terrorism efforts (Wilton Park 2006; Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsbrough 2006). The local community offers invaluable sources of information and intelligence about potential terrorist attacks or individuals at risk. Local communities, can better than anyone else, spot and maybe prevent young people from entering extremism. As Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair stated, just after the 7 July attacks in London. “It is the communities that defeat terrorism, not the police” (Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsbrough 2006: 83). For Blair it was crucial to bring communities back to the heart of the fight against terrorism.

However, sometimes counter terrorism policing involves the risk of being counter productive and increasing distrust and resentment in the Muslim community. Incidents such as the shooting of an innocent man in the aftermath of 7/7 and mass arrests only contribute to a negative image of the police. In particular, the widespread “stop and go” searches used in many countries, are perceived by Muslims as unfair and discriminatory. It is very important to strike a balance between adequate policing and community sensibilities.
Police services are increasingly attending to these issues. In the UK, outreach programmes, such as the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in London, have been established and police officers visit schools in ethnic minority communities to explain that the rationale behind the stop and search policy is the town demography and not prejudice (Briggs, Fieschi and Lownsbrough 2006: 31). The combination of initiatives like the MCU and good neighbourhood policing are necessary tools for building community trust in the police. Having, Muslim police officers is also ideal for creating contact and confidence at the local level. However, establishing a productive relationship between law enforcement, organisations and the Muslim community is a long term process that depends on personal contacts and relationships and not high-profile PR campaigns. As pointed out by a senior British police officer, Colin Cramphorn: "a Pakistani shopkeeper in Bradford would never consider calling the national terrorism hotline, but he may talk to the local bobby whom he has known for years" (cited in Neumann 2006: 80).

Low-key meetings between Intelligence services and Muslim representatives could also be explored in order to demystify the security services and exchange views on a more general scale. For example, PET holds regular meetings with representatives from local communities.

At the operational level, when carrying out counter terrorism operations, many countries, including the UK and Denmark, are completing a “community impact assessment” including a family liaison officer. For example, the Danish police are allocating women police officers to be with and talk to the family in connection with arrests. The purpose is to create trust and confidence. The police, however, have a continuous task in explaining their actions and being sensitive towards religion and anxiety. A pragmatic approach would be to continue to develop and incorporate anti-racism and diversity knowledge in police training programmes.

In addition to the work done by the intelligence services, regular police officers should also be aware of the most typical signs of radicalisation and places of radicalisation. In fact, action cards of typical radicalisation behaviour are already distributed to the local police in many countries. Awareness training needs to be implemented at all levels.
Youth work is central in reaching out to those at risk in schools, Mosques, prisons, clubs and on the street. Substantial initiatives are under way in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands to boost local police, social workers and parents’ competences. In Denmark, for instance the local crime prevention cooperation between School, Social authorities and Police (SSP) has implemented pilot projects, which provide information and advice on how local authorities can spot and prevent radicalisation (see appendix 2).

Finally, so-called “pentiti” programmes could be considered to facilitate de-radicalisation such as exit from a terrorist group. Inspired by the Italian fight against the mafia this approach offers reduced sentences or amnesty for cooperation with the authorities (Post 2005: 635). However, this would mark a significant shift in the legal tradition in many Northern European countries.

The best way to prevent radicalisation is to explore the potential of the Muslim community in working with, and countering, those who hold radical views. Society and authorities can only do part of the job. In order to advance this road, misunderstandings and distrust have to be removed from both within and outside the Muslim community. Dialogue has to be improved and personal relationships nurtured at the local level.

**Public diplomacy and foreign policy**
Looking at terrorists’ own motivations for attacks or plots in the last 2-3 years in Europe, such as London 7/7, the 2004 fertiliser plot, Odense 2006 and the German airport plot 2007, it appears that Western foreign policy provides a major motivational factor for entering the radicalisation path.

The US led “war on terrorism” in Muslim heartland such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the Western support for Israel, the situation in Kashmir and painful pictures from around the world of Muslims suffering as a result of what is perceived as Western foreign policy, are creating widespread dissatisfaction and outrage among Muslim youth. For some, foreign policy is the trigger event that leads them into radicalisation. Incidents such as the Danish cartoon crisis also have the potential to incite people to become involved in extremism. Although countries who do not have forces in conflict zones such as Iraq have experienced home grown radicalisation, there is probably no doubt that changes in Western foreign
policy\textsuperscript{53} will have the power to reduce support for terrorism and the attractiveness of radicalisation.

Due to the significance of foreign policy in shaping the image of the Western world, for Muslims both abroad and at home, think tanks like the British Demos have suggested that governments should open up the foreign policy making process to scrutiny and input from all parts of society. However, a problem with this approach is that it can be seen as circumventing the democratic process where political parties or an elected government has developed a foreign policy. It can be argued that all groups, including Muslims, currently have the opportunity to let their voices be heard through the electoral system and by participating in public debates.\textsuperscript{54}

Another approach could be to redirect a part of the public diplomacy effort towards the domestic arena. Classical public diplomacy is focused on communication with citizens in other countries, for example by the use of cultural exchange, international broadcasting or informational activities. It is aiming at creating warmer feelings or a better image of the country that is exercising public diplomacy. However, public diplomacy will increasingly have also to pay more attention to domestic relations, including communicating and explaining measures and policies within society. The focus should be on explaining the reasons for policy interventions and the underlying values. Information needs to be targeted at groups, which have a vested interest in the relevant policy area, for example Muslims with regard to Middle East policy.

Relevant language information could be considered in order to reach the whole community. Positive stories also need to be brought to the forefront in a domestic context to counter potential triggers for the radicalisation process. Public diplomacy needs to challenge myths and misperceptions about foreign policy and the intentions of governments.

\textsuperscript{53} For British Muslims the highest ranking issue of concern for Muslims overall was foreign policy in a recent survey (Mirza et al 2007: 56)

\textsuperscript{54} In addition, experiences from the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dialogue on foreign policy in 2003 suggest that public involvement in foreign policy is not unproblematic. Participants in meeting were often traditional stakeholders and little opportunity were given to elaborate or others so as to understand or appreciate competing interests. Nevertheless, Canada has continued developing this area and has initiated e-discussions twice a year on foreign policy matters where each eDiscussion has a resource section profiling the Government of Canada’s position on the issue being discussed. The resource section also includes video interviews with experts. This kind of initiative could be considered lifted into a European context.
Activities, such as information dissemination, marketing or listening tours, are not sufficient to undo basic resentment at home or abroad of for example the presence of Western troops in the Arab world and foreign support of US foreign policy, but they are necessary steps in order to engage in dialogue and to promote cross cultural interaction within society.

Governments should be building bridges at all levels of society and ways to facilitate this could include the following: Holding regular ministerial briefings or meetings with representatives from Muslim communities as well as those who are publicly critical towards policies. Ministerial participation in public debates at universities or in local communities would signal concern and involvement. Information about engagement in controversial conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan should be targeted at schools, NGOs, youth clubs and communities using CD ROMs, the Internet, leaflets etc. It is important that the information is focused and involvement of local Muslim news media would be especially beneficial. Emphasis should be on dialogue.

This communication strategy will not remove the threat of home grown terrorism or individuals’ motivation for entering the radicalisation process but may have an impact on the wider Muslim community, and thereby help reducing a tacit support for terrorism.

Finally, classical foreign policy efforts should support measures by foreign governments to reduce and control the export of preachers and literature that might incite violence. At the same time, active engagement with countries which have potentially dangerous policies, such as Saudi Arabia’s policy of financing Wahabist educational facilities across the Muslim world, and those who disseminate offending (separatist or hate) literature is necessary.\textsuperscript{55}

**In summary**

- Local communities and dialogue play essential roles in counter-radicalisation measures. Local communities can better than anyone else spot and maybe prevent young people from entering extremism.

\textsuperscript{55} These recommendations have been put forward by the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies conference in Ankara (14-17 May 2007) on “Advancing International Cooperation in Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism CIST): Toward Building a Comprehensive Strategy” and by a recent Policy Exchange investigation into the character of the literature currently available in mainstream sites of Islamic religious instruction in the UK (MacEion 2007).
• Care is needed not to let the actions of a few individuals taint the whole community. It is necessary to address public misunderstanding and hostility towards Muslims by using non-inflammatory language and promoting Muslim role models.

• Government involvement should be minimised but partnerships are needed with government agencies, police and other communities.

• The range of voices heard within the Muslim community needs to be broadened and involve new members, not necessarily traditional leaders.

• Imams, parents and Muslim organisations should be proactive in countering the narrative of radical Islam. For example by using statements from moderate Islamic figures or persons who have left extremists groups. Clear and unambiguous signals need to be sent to reduce tacit support for extremism.

• Counter-ideology measures could include non-Islamic ideas and Western values including equality and freedom of speech (in order to create a collective identity and community feeling within society).

• The Internet should be used to counter extremism by sitting up web pages to discuss identity/religion.

• Governments should engage with Muslims as citizens, not through their religious identity.

• Awareness training of street level workers, police officers, social workers, teachers and Imams etc. is needed regarding the early warning signals of radicalisation. Increased cooperation between police, school and social authorities should be encouraged including development of outreach programmes.

• Police need to further develop local outreach programmes and build trust in the local community.

• Public diplomacy should to a larger extent focus on the domestic audience and seek to challenge myths and misperceptions about foreign policy within the Muslim population. Local media and community organisations need to be involved in this process.
13. Conclusion

Home grown Islamist terrorism in Europe is a relatively new phenomenon that became visible after 9/11 and has accelerated since approximately 2003. It is not the first time home grown terrorism has surfaced in Europe. For example, the 1970-1980s saw a similar movement of ideologically motivated young people who engaged in terrorist acts in their home countries. The new element is the apparent influence of radical interpretations of Islam and militant Islamist ideology as motivating factors.

The involved persons are primarily young males of Muslim background (often second or third generation immigrants/descendants) and converts to Islam. Women are mainly having supportive roles. Many of those involved have led ordinary lives often without a criminal record and they come from all areas of society.

The actual radicalisation process happens gradually and can run from a few months to years. The typical pattern has four overlapping phases: 1) pre-radicalisation, 2) conversion, 3) indoctrination and 4) actual terrorism. The process is unique to every person and there seems not to be a common profile of home grown terrorists. Individuals appear to begin the radicalisation process on their own rather through top down radicalisation. However, entering the process of radicalisation does not necessarily mean that an individual progresses through all four stages and become a terrorist. There is no determinism in the process and people may exit at any given phase.

The transformation of seemingly normal and integrated young individuals, who have had their upbringing and cultural influence in Western Europe, are probably influenced by three categories of factors: Background, trigger and opportunity factors.

In the pre-radicalisation phase, several background factors appear to make people more vulnerable to radicalisation. The most common background factors are a (Muslim) identity crisis, experience of discrimination, relative deprivation, alienation, parallel societies, youthful rebellion and a relative lack of Muslim public debate on Islamist terrorism in the West. However, it is important to note that these background factors only are indicative. Most Muslims or converts who live in deprived areas, who have an identity crisis, who feel discriminated against etc. do not turn into terrorists.
The transition from pre-radicalisation to actual radicalisation (phase 2-4) seems to be influenced by a series of trigger factors. In particular, it seems to be factors such as foreign policy, military intervention in Muslim countries, a single provocative event such as the Danish cartoon crisis, or the presence of a charismatic person, that are able to trigger individuals to make the central leap from pre-radicalisation to conversion and identification with radical Islam. A personal crisis can also trigger this change. Outrage and revenge against the West appear to be strong motivators.

Different venues or locations provide a setting for radicalisation by offering an opportunity to meet likeminded people or serving as a recruiting ground for radicalisators. Typical places are the Mosque, schools, the work place, prisons, sporting activities and the Internet. In particular, the Internet provides easy access to material about radical Islam and Jihad literature.

Advanced radicalisation (phase 3) is often characterised by increased group bonding and participation in outdoor and paramilitary activities. Overseas travel in particular, has been associated with the most recent terrorist cases in Europe. In combination with increased isolation from former life and a retreat from regular social meeting places like the Mosque, these behaviours could indicate extremist tendencies. The main activities are centred on the group and sometimes a spiritual leader and take place at private locations, which are hard to detect for the police and intelligence services. Formation of a group and a presence of ringleader appear to be crucial factors for progressing to the final stages of the radicalisation process.

Specific indicators of Islamist radicalisation are difficult to identify, but the following list of indicators may give an idea of possible warning signs of a radicalisation process. In particular, a shift in religious activity and increased identification with the radical Islamist ideology can be the first steps in the radicalisation process:

Phase 1: Pre-radicalisation
- No specific signs of radicalisation

Phase 2: Conversion and identification
- Changed appearance (e.g. growing facial hair)
- Gradual rejection Western lifestyle
- A change of personality (a gradual isolation from former life)
- A change in religiosity
- Increased attendance at the Mosque or religious study groups
- Affiliation with like-minded individuals

Phase 3: Indoctrination
- Travel to a Muslim country and preferably an area of conflict.
- Training camp attendance
- Strengthening of collective identity
- Increased isolation from former life
- Meetings at private locations, which are difficult to detect
- Security awareness

Phase 4: Action
- Purchase of bomb making material or other means of terror
- Test run
- Reconnaissance
- Aware of not attracting attention by the way they dress or behave

It is important to note that none of the indicators is conclusive and most people who fit the description would never reach the fourth and final phase and carry out terrorism. Most Muslims neither support, nor approve, terrorism. Furthermore, indicators do entail the risk of removing the focus away from relevant and potentially dangerous persons not fitting the picture.

Counter radicalisation
The optimal strategy to counter radicalisation is preventing young people from entering the radicalisation process in the first place. In this regard, several counter radicalisation measures seem relevant.

1. Societal measures such as integration policies and the combat of Islamophobia and racism in society are necessary. Governments should engage with Muslims as equal citizens, not only through their religion, in order to create a sense of being part of a society with shared values. It is crucial not to let a few individuals taint the whole community. Public misunderstanding and hostility towards Muslims should be addressed by using non-inflamatory language and for instance promoting Muslim role models.
2. Counter ideology efforts are necessary to neutralise the effects of radical and highly polarising views. The schooling system has a vital role to play in confronting misperceptions and myths. Development of more “home grown” Imams as well as strengthening the qualifications of practising Imams should also be encouraged. Counter ideology will have to include non-Islamic ideas and Western values, such as equality and freedom of speech.

The Muslim community should be particularly proactive in countering the narrative of radical Islam. For example, Imams, parents and organisations could promote statements from moderate Islamic figures or persons who have left extremist groups. Official government involvement should be minimised but partnerships are needed with government agencies, police and youth workers to have an effective impact. Muslim civil society also needs to be extended and involve new members, such as women or youth.

Finally, there is a need for development of minimum standards for Islamic institutions including openness to youth, inter-faith schemes and counter extremism programmes. Clear and unambiguous signals need to be sent to reduce tacit support for extremism.

3. Awareness training of street-level workers, police officers, social workers, teachers and Imams, about the early warning signals of radicalisation are crucial. Confidence, understanding and trust are prerequisites for fruitful cooperation and information exchange. Outreach programmes need to be further developed as well as increased cooperation between schools, social authorities and police.

4. There is a need for public diplomacy to put more focus on the domestic audience in order to challenge myths and misperceptions about foreign policy within part of the local Muslim population. Local media, the Internet and community organisations need to be involved in this process.

A common component in the suggested four measures to tackle radicalisation is the essential role of local communities and dialogue. Communities are in a central position for detecting and countering radical behaviour within their own ranks although those involved might try to hide their activities from friends and family.
While the state and public in general must play a role, Muslim communities should take
the lead in tackling problems and supply many of the solutions in preventing radicalisa-
tion.

Alienated youths, who are at a cross road in their lives, must be able to envisage a future
within society. Convinced extremists are probably very difficult to de-radicalise, hence,
people, who could go either way, should be the main focus of counter prevention measures.
Efforts have to be directed at typical places of opportunity for radicalisation such as the
Mosque, the Internet, school, youth clubs, work, prison and sport activities. However,
these broader preventive efforts have to be supplemented by de-radicalisation measures
(education, one on one talks etc.) of persons who are already in the later phases of the
radicalisation process.

Like other types of criminal activity, the causes of radicalisation are complex and preven-
tive measures can be difficult to implement. To a large extent many European countries
have developed counter terrorism and prevention strategies, which are focusing on the
relevant issues, but it is a continuous process to adapt strategies, as more is known about
the radicalisation process and risk factors. The radicalisation process is dynamic and the
dangers of overgeneralisation of what drives home grown terrorists are ever present.

The threat of home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation is unlikely to be signifi-
cantly reduced within the coming years, or even decade, but community building and de-
velopment of shared values are likely to lessen the attractiveness of radical Islam. In par-
ticular, the culture of hatred and the ideology of “killing in God's name” need to be re-
versed by engagement of communities and dialogue at all levels of society.
Appendix 1: Ideological Influence Map (2006)

Notes:
- Arrows indicate who is citing whom.
- Thick lines are for an author who cites another author repeatedly.
- Size of node indicates someone who is a key broker of information in the network (i.e. “betweenness centrality”).

Source:
**Appendix 2: Examples of existing counter radicalisation measures in the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Counter ideology** | Engagement of ministers in meetings with Muslims in order to listen to concerns.  
Engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging extremist ideology (helping Muslims who are disputing these ideas).  
Promoting community leadership to withstand extremism.  
Setting up local web-based projects where young Muslims can talk about their identities and grievances.  
Initiation of a grassroots-led scholars road show where influential mainstream Muslim scholars have spoken against terrorism. | Counteracting dissemination of highly polarising and radical views via television, CD-ROMs, reading material and on the Internet.  
Where possible the most radical web sites are taken offline. | Engagement of ministers in meetings with Muslims.  
For example, in 2006, the Prime Minister held a dialogue meeting with a number of Muslim representatives – leaders of associations, politicians and imams. There was general agreement that extreme actions, committed by radical minority groups, must be condemned and opposed. |
| **Police and community** | The UK prison service has started a national training event for Imams and a mentoring programme for prisoners potentially susceptible to radicalisation (also support upon their release into local community).  
Establishment of the Muslim contact unit in London consisting of officers with language skills (to for example form partnerships with local mosque managers that are under threat of extremism).  
Establishment of 6 regional Muslim forums against extremism (consist of police, public service and local Muslim community representatives).  
National schemes including training Imams and teaching citizenship in Mosque schools. | Establishment of rehabilitation projects in prisons and other places.  
Polarisation and radicalisation are countered, through education, intercultural dialogue, parenting support, work placements, employment and the Internet.  
Training programmes staffed by experts and Imams are offered to parents, local administrators and professionals working closely with young people.  
Development of tools and methods to offer a retort to radical expressions narrative for administrators, teachers, police and youth workers. | A radicalisation awareness programme is presently being implemented within the prison system.  
Initiation of pilot projects with local SSPs (School, Social authorities and Police) by providing information and advice on how local authorities can spot and prevent radicalisation in their daily work with crime prevention.  
Nationwide “police against terrorism” project aims at activating and involving all national police districts in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation (awareness).  
PET is hosting dialogue forums with representatives from 1) ethnic minorities and 2) Imams. |
| **Foreign policy** | Bilateral development assistance programmes are focused on countries like Pakistan, | Bilateral development assistance to several Muslims countries in Asia and Africa. | Bilateral development assistance to Muslim countries in the Middle East and South and |
Societal measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan and Bangladesh.</td>
<td>Support reform and modernisation projects in the Middle East and North Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invitation of candidate from the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) to participate in scholarship programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy is part of the radicalisation action plan and activities are closely aligned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia.</td>
<td>A specific plan for supporting developing countries in countering terrorism and the conditions that might foster radicalisation has been developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced dialogue with the countries in the Middle East/North Africa as well support reform processes in the countries (Arab initiative).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration policies in order to reduce inequality associated with race and faith.

The 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is outlawing the use of threatening words or behavior intended to incite hatred against groups of people defined by their religious beliefs or lack of belief.

Integration policies in order to reduce inequality associated with race and faith.

Familiarise immigrants with the Dutch democratic legal order and society, including increasing the knowledge among indigenous Dutch citizens about the religion and culture of ‘new Dutch citizens’.

Integration policies in order to reduce inequality associated with race and faith.

The government has promoted the use of role models in the ongoing campaign “Need for all Youngsters”. Local municipalities are also creating their own schemes for integration through role models.

The minister for Integration has participated in a series of activities designed to bring about dialogue on integration, which will include meeting young people from ethnic minorities and immigrant women to hear about their experience of integration.

Sources: UK strategy 2006; BBC News 6 November 2007 (Internet used to target extremism); the UK Home Office; The Dutch Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 (MinBZK: 2006); PET annual reports 2003 and 2004-2005; the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Danish Ministry for Integration.
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